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CHAPTER I
Introduction
This dissertation consists of four essays on development economics. The first two
essays study educational challenges in rural Ethiopia. In Chapter II, the first essay
explores a school meals program in Ethiopia. In food-insecure parts of poor coun-
tries, where school enrollment is low, school meals can provide a strong incentive to
poor households to send their children to school. School meals appear to be attrac-
tive as they may not only increase school participation and reduce dropout but may
also improve learning and cognitive development. Chapter III investigates the role
of poor eyesight, which is a considerable burden in developing countries. As refrac-
tive errors are rarely corrected through eyeglasses, particularly in rural parts of poor
countries, children loose educational opportunities if eyesight problems lead to low
grade attainment and prevent better learning outcomes. Chapter IV uses data on
four financial literacy training programs, which were implemented in three countries
(Cambodia, the Philippines and Vietnam), to examine whether financial literacy
training can improve microfinance clients’ risk management in order to avoid over-
indebtedness and reduce vulnerability. Chapter V investigates the role of parental
migration on children’s school participation using data from Moldova. While migra-
tion, through remittances, has the potential to contribute to children’s education by
1
2making more resources available, parental migration may be detrimental as it implies
parental absence. Thus, it is not clear a priori whether parental migration has a net
positive or negative impact on educational outcomes of children who are left behind.
CHAPTER II
School Meals and Educational Outcomes in Rural
Ethiopia
2.1 Introduction
Pervasive undernutrition remains a serious obstacle to children’s physical and
cognitive development in many developing countries. Hunger diminishes children’s
ability to concentrate and to retain what they learn at school. School meals at-
tempt to improve poor and credit-constrained households’ investments in education
by subsidizing the cost of schooling and by reducing short-term hunger and improv-
ing nutrition. In 2008, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) provided
school meals to around 22 million children in 70 countries (Bundy et al., 2009). In
poor countries, where school enrollment is low, school meals can provide a strong
incentive to poor households to send their children to school and to keep them there.1
School meals appear to be attractive as they may not only increase school participa-
tion and reduce dropout but may also improve learning and cognitive development.
The educational benefits of school meals programs depend on the modality, tar-
geting and implementation of the program. The two basic modalities constitute (i)
1Other interventions to attract children to school that have been found to increase school en-
rollment and attendance include deworming (Miguel and Kremer, 2004), provision of additional
teachers (Duflo et al., 2008) and conditional cash transfers (Behrman et al., 2009).
3
4providing school meals on-site or (ii) take-home rations, both of which may be com-
bined with micronutrient supplementation (Adelman et al., 2008b). While on-site
meals (breakfast, lunch or snacks) are usually provided to all students, take-home
rations are often given only to girls conditional on school attendance exceeding some
threshold. School meals may also involve local (community or household) contribu-
tions. These contributions may be in kind, such as firewood and water, or in cash
to cover cooks’ remunerations. In most developing countries, school meals programs
target areas with high food insecurity, low enrollment or high gender disparity. If the
program is less well implemented, food distribution might be subject to disruption
and may divert class and teacher time away from learning.
This paper investigates the impact of a school meals program, its modalities
and implementation on learning achievement, concentration/attention span, cogni-
tive development, and children’s activities using data from chronically food-insecure
districts in rural Ethiopia. It contributes to the literature in a number of ways.
Whereas many studies have provided evidence on the impact of school meals, much
less is known about the role played by modalities and the implementation of school
meals programs. Nevertheless, children are often involved in the acquisition of the
material contributions (such as firewood) their households are required/expected to
make available as part of the preparation of school meals. This has a potentially
detrimental effect on the learning achievement of children. The paper examines the
effect of school meals on children’s activities. In addition, it also investigates the
effect of school meals, the modalities and implementation on learning achievement
and cognitive development of children. Finally, the paper also contributes to the lit-
erature by highlighting the role of school meals on children’s concentration/attention
span – an outcome that has not been explored in the literature. In particular, the
5paper investigates whether children on school meals are able to concentrate better
due to the alleviation of short-term hunger during school hours. Considering likely
variations in the effects of school meals across the gender and age of children, the
paper also conducts gender and age based sub-group analyses.
The paper’s main finding are that (i) supplementing on-site meals with take-home
rations positively affects concentration, reading, writing and arithmetic skills, and
(ii) serving food at the end of classes adversely affects outcomes relative to serving
food at the beginning of classes. However, the timing of food appears to only affect
the girls. Further, children are found to benefit more if households contribute to the
program.
2.2 The school meals program in Ethiopia
The Government of Ethiopia has adopted an Education and Training Policy in
1994 with a view to achieving universal primary education by the year 2015.2 To
attain this goal, the Government of Ethiopia has so far been implementing three
phases of multi-year Education Sector Development Programmes. One of their main
components has been the school meals program, which the Government of Ethiopia
undertakes in partnership with the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP).
Education Sector Development Programme III has expanded school meals to fur-
ther schools in food insecure and vulnerable areas in Ethiopia. In particular, the
program targets pastoralist areas and chronically food deficit highland woredas (dis-
tricts) in the country. The main objectives of the school meals program in Ethiopia
are to: attract children to school in chronically food insecure areas, increase en-
rollment, stabilize attendance and reduce dropout. The program also pays special
2Most of the discussion in this section is drawn from the 2007 Country Status Report of the
Standardized School Feeding Survey (WFP, 2008).
6attention to increasing girls’ enrollment in program areas with a view to bringing
about gender parity in school enrollment.
WFP sponsored school meals started in Ethiopia in 1994 with an initial pilot
project in war-affected zones in Tigray region. The program has so far provided
school meals in six regions of the country (Afar, Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR, Somali
and Tigray). In 2008, WFP provided food for 915 schools with 482,000 children
benefiting from school meals. The per child ration consists of 150 gm of corn-soya
blend (CSB), 6 gm of fortified vegetable oil and 3 gm of iodised salt, provided as
a cooked meal on every school day. Chronically food insecure districts in the six
regions with lower enrollment and higher gender disparity have been the target of
the program.
In 2002, the World Food Programme launched the Girls’ Initiative in food inse-
cure areas in Afar and Somali regions, and pastoralist areas of Oromia and SNNPR
regions. The initiative has the objective of encouraging girls’ education and narrow-
ing the gender gap. It provides 8 liters of vegetable oil per semester conditional on
80 percent girl’s attendance in pastoralist and semi pastoralist areas, in addition to
on-site school meals. In 2008, 68,000 girls received take-home rations.
In about 300 communities, WFP’s school meals program is supported by Chil-
dren in Local Development (CHILD), a community-led planning tool initiated by
WFP and the Ministry of Education. CHILD is primarily intended to increase the
sustainability and impact of school meals; and mainly involves capacity building for
government partners and beneficiary communities. It also assists communities to
plan for a child-friendly school environment in order to improve the learning atmo-
sphere.
7School meals involve local contribution, which is usually in kind, with the ex-
ception of cooks’ remuneration. Communities may contribute labor e.g. to build
canteens and storage rooms. Additionally, parents may contribute firewood and
water to support the preparation of meals or cash to cover payments for cooks.
2.3 Review of the literature
School meals subsidize the cost of school attendance by providing food with the
potential of improving learning and nutrition. If beneficiary households respond to
school meals by reducing their food expenditures, more resources will be available,
which may increase expenditures on education or change children’s activities. In the
short-run, school meals are expected to alleviate hunger in the classroom and help
the child to concentrate better and learn more. In the long-run, improved nutrition
is expected to increase children’s physiological capacity for learning and to reduce
morbidity by strengthening the immune system, thereby reducing missed school days
due to sickness. The impact of on-site school meals on learning is expected to oper-
ate through an increase in school attendance and through improvement in learning
efficiency while in school, as in the absence of hunger children are able to concen-
trate better and as (micronutrient-fortified) school meals may also improve cognitive
function (Adelman et al., 2008b).
A number of studies found school meals to raise enrollment and attendance
(Ahmed, 2004; Dreze and Goyal, 2003; Kazianga et al., 2009; Tan et al., 1999; Ver-
meersch and Kremer, 2005). However, effects on learning achievement and cognitive
development are less clear. Filmer and Schady (2009) argue that students may not
learn much due to overcrowding as a consequence of school meals attracting new
students, who are often poorer. Poor marginal students may do worse in terms of
8learning if schools cater to elites (Duflo et al., 2008). If poor, credit-constrained
households send their most promising children to school first, then the marginal stu-
dents will have less favourable characteristics, e.g. in terms of ability (Card, 1999).
On-site school meals may adversely affect the effectiveness of the educational pro-
cess, e.g. by food distribution interfering with teaching time. In some cases the total
amount of hours devoted to teaching is found to decrease by 15 percent (Vermeersch
and Kremer, 2005). The environment in which school meals take place also plays
an important role. If a program increases enrollment and attendance, with teach-
ing quality being low or teachers’ absenteeism high, it is unlikely to induce better
learning achievement. For example, Vermeersch and Kremer (2005) found no impact
of school meals on cognitive skills; better test scores were primarily associated with
greater teachers’ experience. Adelman et al. (2008a) found positive effects of school
meals and take-home rations in Northern Uganda on math and on literacy only for
older children; no impact was found on cognitive skills as measured by the Raven’s
test. Kazianga et al. (2009) found that school meals increase enrollment but fail to
improve attendance and academic performance.
A body of literature investigates the impact of school meals on (short-term) cog-
nitive development, focussing on the specific micronutrient content of school meals.
Although the empirical evidence is mixed, there appears to be a consensus on the
importance of animal source food. For example, Whaley et al. (2003) explore the
effect of three different diets (meat, milk, and energy), suggesting that animal source
food has greater impact on cognitive function. Similarly, Gewa et al. (2009) inves-
tigate the effect of different school meals comprised of exclusively vegetarian meals,
milk, or supplemented with meat; results show that the meat variant is relatively
more important in terms of improving cognitive function among school-age children.
9However, most of these studies are conducted in a laboratory setting, which limits
their external validity.
2.4 Data
The data used in this paper come from a survey conducted in 2010 by the World
Food Programme Country Office Ethiopia in partnership with the University of
Mannheim involving school catchment areas in food-insecure woredas (districts) in
the four major regions of Ethiopia (Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray). Em-
ploying a two-stage sampling design, the survey sampled 200 school catchment areas
in the four regions of the country stratified by highland and pastoral areas.3 The
survey covered three types of school catchment areas – program school, non-program
school and phased-out program school catchment areas. The first-stage sampling
was conducted using program woredas as the sampling frame for non-program school
catchment areas. This type of program/non-program school catchment area match-
ing procedure was chosen in order to attain comparable control school catchment
areas. The second-stage sampling entailed sampling of ten children aged 7 to 13
years per school catchment area who were either enrolled in school or not at the
time of the survey.4 This design feature of the survey allows for a richer analysis
than surveys that are based on the school only. It allows to investigate relationships
within the school service area, circumventing selection problems associated with chil-
dren enrolled in school based on unobserved characteristics. Only students enrolled
in grades 2 to 4 were included.
We dropped schools where food had not been distributed yet at the time of the
survey (3 schools). The fact that these schools were still without food although the
3In Tigray and Amhara WFP’s school meals are operational in highland areas only.
4For a more detailed description of the survey design see Haile et al. (2011).
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school year had already started cannot be attributed to pure chance. Rather, these
schools might be different along characteristics that are unobserved. In addition, as
we are interested in current school meals on current outcomes, children in schools
where food had not been distributed yet would be at a disadvantage. Furthermore,
this paper excludes phased out program schools from the sample used for the analysis,
as the focus of this paper is investigating the effect of current school meals on learning
achievement. Table 2.1 shows the distribution of schools across regions and livelihood
(highland vs. pastoralist) in the sample.
Table 2.1: Distribution of schools, by region and livelihood
Program Non-program Total
Amhara highland 14 17 31
Oromia highland 14 14 28
Oromia pastoralist 12 13 25
Tigray highland 14 16 30
SNNPR highland 10 12 22
SNNPR pastoralist 5 5 10
Subtotal highland 52 59 111
Subtotal pastoralist 17 18 35
Total 69 77 146
To measure scholastic performance, we tested children on their reading, writing
and arithmetic skills.5 Children were tested regardless of whether they were enrolled
in school. For reading, children were asked to read pre-prepared letters, words and
sentences. In the writing test, children were asked to write down pre-prepared sen-
tences that the interviewer read aloud. Children were also tested on their arithmetic
skills using up to three different arithmetic questions. In all three cases, two different
versions of the tests were administered depending on the age of the children involved
5We adapted our tests on reading, writing and arithmetic skills from the Young Lives project, a
longitudinal study conducted in four countries, core-funded by the UK Department for International
Development (DFID).
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– one set for children between the ages of 7 and 10 years and a more difficult set for
children between the ages of 11 and 13 years.
To test children’s cognitive development we use the Raven’s Standard Progressive
Matrices (SPM) test. The major benefit of this test is that no formal schooling is
required to solve the questions. The test is a measure of problem solving ability and
consists of selecting bits with different shape and design to complete matrices. We
asked the first 25 questions of the Raven’s test, including problem sets A and B.
To test children’s concentration and attention we use a modified version of the
d2 Test of Attention (Brickenkamp and Zillmer, 1998). In its original form, the
test consists of crossing out symbols – the letter d with 2 strokes above or below –
while leaving out all other symbols, i.e. any d with more or less than 2 strokes and
the letter q irrespective of the number of strokes. We modified the original test by
replacing the d ’s and q ’s with 6’s and 9’s as the Latin alphabet is not used in all our
sample regions. The score we use for measuring performance in terms of speed and
accuracy is composed of the total number of symbols covered minus the number of
wrongly crossed-out symbols and the number of wrongly left out symbols.6 Children
were asked to cover 8 rows of symbols, each row comprising 47 symbols for which
they were given 20 seconds (per row).
Table 2.2 reports child, household and school characteristics in program and non-
program school service areas. The children’s mean age is close to ten years with 68
percent of children aged 10 years or less (10 years is the cutoff above which children
were given a more difficult set of tests). Slightly more boys than girls are included
in our sample. If children were enrolled, their mean grade was grade 3. Around 20
6We also use an alternative measure consisting of the number of correctly crossed-out symbols
minus the number of falsely crossed-out symbols called Concentration Performance score. However,
changes in results are only minor.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics (means) of selected characteristics of children, house-
holds, and schools
Variable Names Non-program Program p-value
Child characteristics
Age 9.91 9.96 .66
Children aged ≤ 10 .68 .68 .9
Male .52 .56 .19
Grade 3 2.98 .64
Enrolled .8 .79 .45
HH characteristics
Number of children 3.85 4.08 .01
Total expenditures (log) 5.82 5.82 .93
Neither parent attended school .58 .68 0
Male headed household .83 .89 0
Livestock index 3.08 3.89 .01
School characteristics
School equipment index 2.13 2.43 0
Highland .76 .75 .61
Notes: The p-value stems from a means comparing t-test.
percent of children were not enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Households
in program school service areas have slightly more children on average, have a higher
share of either parents without education and are more often headed by a male
household head. They also have a higher livestock index.7 Children residing in
program school catchment areas have access to better school facilities as measured
by our school equipment index. This index is defined as the sum (range 0-4) of
whether sanitation facilities are available, school buildings are in a good condition,
the school compound is fenced and classrooms have glass windows.
Table 2.3 presents characteristics of the modality and the implementation of the
program. Around a quarter of schools have the additional school meals program
component – take-home rations consisting of vegetable oil that households receive
7The livestock index is a weighted index using tropical livestock units (TLU) as weights as
follows: cattle are weighted by 0.7 TLU, donkeys or horses are weighted by 0.3 TLU, goats or sheep
are weighted by 0.15 TLU and poultry are weighted by 0.05 TLU.
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each semester conditional on 80 percent girls’ attendance. Almost 50 percent of the
schools have the additional CHILD (Children in Local Development) component that
involves capacity building for government partners and beneficiary communities to
assist communities to plan for a child-friendly school environment in order to improve
the learning environment. Schools usually establish food management committees
as part of the program to oversee delivery, storage and distribution of food. In
59 percent of cases the food management committee has been trained to enable
members to more effectively assume their responsibilities. Training may also be
provided to the cooks. In 43 percent of cases cooks have been trained. 88 percent
of schools reported that they experienced disruptions in the distribution of food.
Almost equally important as reasons for the disruptions are lack of food8 and lack of
water. In 16 percent of cases schools reported that cooks’ absenteeism was the main
reason for the disruption of food distribution. In terms of the timing of school meals,
in the majority of schools food is distributed half-way through the school day. Most
schools use a traditional three-stone fire place for cooking, only 15 percent of schools
use an improved stove. The majority of schools consider their storage facilities to be
adequate and safe. In 25 percent of schools students use a special eating place within
the school compound. The mean program duration is 8.43 years in the sample.
Table 2.4 reports households’ contribution to the program. 6 percent of benefi-
ciary households are member of a food management committee. Their most impor-
tant contribution to school meals is firewood, followed by cash and water contribu-
tion. Only 2 percent of beneficiary households report no contribution at all.
8Lack of food occurs mainly because of late delivery to the school. In Ethiopia, WFP procures
food and the delivery of food non-locally.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics of school meals program modality and implementa-
tion
Variable Names Mean
Modality
Take-home rations .26
Children in Local Development (CHILD) .48
When distributed
Beginning of day .34
Half-way through .62
End of day .04
Implementation
Food management committee trained .59
Cooks trained .43
Disruption in food distribution (yes=1) .88
Reasons for days w/o food
No food .25
No water .28
No fuel .03
Cooks were absent .16
Other reason .28
Facilities
Three-stone fire place .85
Improved stove .15
Storage facility adequate/safe .87
Special eating place in school .25
Program duration (years) 8.43
Number of observations (schools) 69
Table 2.4: Summary statistics of households’ involvement and contribution
Variable Names Mean
Households’ involvement
Member of food management committee .06
Households’ contribution
No contribution .02
Cash .35
Firewood .49
Labor .03
Water .09
Firewood, labor, or water .61
Number of observations (households) 688
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2.5 Empirical specification
This study is interested in identifying the impact of school meals, its implemen-
tation and the role of modalities on cognitive skills, concentration/attention span,
reading, writing, arithmetics and children’s activities. These outcomes are corre-
lated with school, teacher, household or child characteristics, many of which are not
observed.
The estimable regression model is the following linear model:
(2.1) yis = X
′
isα + D
′
sδ + is.
We estimate the effects of school meals, the modalities and the implementation on
child i′s outcome yis in school service area s using ordinary least squares. Ds is a
vector including program status which may also include the modality and character-
istics of implementation, Xis is a vector of child, household, and school service area
characteristics, and is denotes the error term.
Alternatively, we also use a random-effects model based on generalized least
squares to account for the error structure::
(2.2) yis = X
′
isα + D
′
sδ + ηs + µis,
with Ds and Xis defined as before, and ηs are unobserved school service area effects
assumed to be random and to follow a probability distribution known up to some
finite set of parameters and µis denotes the error term.
We control for household and individual characteristics to account for possible
correlation between school meals (modalities and implementation) and the error
term. For example, we do not observe children’s nutrition – a variable that is likely
to be correlated with school meals. However, we do observe household and individual
16
characteristics that inter alia determine how well a child is able to cope with shocks
to food availability. Furthermore, controlling for wealth is mandated as wealthy
households are more likely to invest more in both health and education relative to
poor households.
Our variables controlling for household composition include the sex of the house-
hold head and the number of children. Additional household-level control variables
include a dummy variable for whether at least one parent has some education, the
log of total household expenditures and asset holdings.9 Later, we use the asset in-
dex to categorize households into low and high asset households using median asset
ownership as the cutoff point. Variables controlling for child characteristics include
the age and the sex of the child.
We control for school characteristics by using a school equipment index.10 We also
use region dummies and a dummy that controls for areas dominated by pastoralism.
In sum, the vector Xis includes the following variables: the child’s age, a dummy
for the child being aged between 7 and 10 years,11 the child’s sex, a dichotomous
variable whether the head of household is male, the number of children in the house-
hold, a dichotomous variable whether both parents are uneducated, the logarithm of
total household expenditures, the school equipment index, a dichotomous variable
9Asset holdings are measured using an index of livestock that is a weighted index using tropical
livestock units (TLU) as weights as follows: cattle are weighted by 0.7 TLU, donkeys or horses are
weighted by 0.3 TLU, goats or sheep are weighted by 0.15 TLU and poultry are weighted by 0.05
TLU.
10As explain above, this index is defined as the sum (range 0-4) of whether sanitation facilities are
available, school buildings are in a good condition, the school compound is fenced and classrooms
have glass windows.
11In the regressions, we control for whether a child is aged between 7 and 10 years because the
survey administered different tests for younger and older children – except for the Raven’s test
and the concentration test which were administered irrespective of age –, as in small samples, the
distribution of younger children might be unequal across program status.
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whether the district of the school catchment area is characterized by pastoralism,
and controls for the region (Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray).
We use two different samples: (i) for estimating the effects of the modalities and
the implementation we use a sample that only includes program school catchment
areas and (ii) for estimating the effects of school meals we use a sample that includes
both program and non-program (control) school catchment areas. In case (i), the
vector Ds includes the full set of modality and implementation variables: whether
CHILD is implemented, take-home rations are distributed, the food management
committee is trained, the cooks are trained, the school had at least one day of
food not being distributed, whether food is served half-way through classes, whether
food is served at the end of classes (serving food at the beginning of classes is the
reference category), the duration of the program, whether households contribute to
the program with cash, and whether households contribute with material (defined as
labor, water or firewood contributions), the reference category being no contribution.
These modality and implementation variables are included simultaneously in the
estimations. In case (ii), the vector Ds includes a binary variable indicating whether
school meals are provided and the interaction of this variable with a binary variable
indicating whether take-home rations are provided.
We estimate the impact of (the modalities and the implementation of) school
meals on all eligible individuals, i.e. all school-age children in a school catchment
area, because the program was offered at the school catchment area level with take-
up being incomplete, as not all eligible children are enrolled in schools where school
meals are offered. Hence, we estimate the average intent to treat effect (AIT) that
provides a lower bound of magnitude for the average treatment on the treated effect
18
(ATT), if eligible compliers benefit more than non-compliers from the intervention.12
To estimate the AIT of the school meals program, we use school-age children in non-
program school catchment areas as the counterfactual. To estimate the AIT of the
modalities and the implementation of the program, we restrict the sample to school-
age children in program school catchment areas, controlling for all other modality
and implementation characteristics as well as household, child and school catchment
area characteristics.
2.6 Results
To examine the effect of the modalities and the type of implementation of school
meals as well as the effect of the provision of school meals, we use ordinary least
squares and the random-effects model. Because the random-effects model gives very
similar results, we only present results using the ordinary least squares estimator.
2.6.1 The impact of the modalities and the implementation of the school
meals program
Tables 2.5-2.8 report the impact of the modalities and the implementation of the
school meals program, separately for boys and girls and by age group.
Cognitive skills
Table 2.5 explores the impact of the modalities and the implementation on boys’
outcomes. We do not detect impact on cognitive skills as measured by the Raven’s
test.
Table 2.6 explores the impact of the modalities and the implementation for girls.
The CHILD component appears to be favourable in terms of cognitive skills as we find
12See also Kazianga et al. (2009).
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a positive effect of about 1.2 points (s.e.= 0.57).13 We also find cooks who are trained
to have a positive effect. In terms of the timing of the food distribution, serving food
half-way or at the end of the school day appears to be less favourable than serving
food at the beginning of the school day (which is the reference category). We also
find a longer program duration to improve cognitive skills for girls, an additional
year increases the Raven’s test score by 0.16 points (s.e.= 0.077).
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present results for younger and older children, respectively. We
find cooks’ training to positively affect cognitive skills for younger children and train-
ing of the food management committee to positively affect cognitive skills for older
children. We do not detect impact of the remaining modality and implementation
variables on cognitive skills.
13In the sample of program school catchment area girls, the score has a mean of 12.8 and a
standard deviation of 3.5. See Table 2.12 in the Appendix.
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Concentration
We find a longer program duration to improve concentration for boys, an addi-
tional year increases the concentration score by 6.9 points (s.e.= 1.5).14 We detect
no impact of the remaining modality and implementation variables for boys.
We find take-home rations to improve girls’ concentration by 82.5 points (s.e.=
23.8), or by about 1.5 standard deviations. This effect is particularly large in terms
of economic significance. Remember that take-home rations are conditional on girls’
attendance, supplementing on-site school meals in pastoralist and semi pastoralist
areas. They are aimed at improving girls’ attendance in areas that have lower girls’
school attendance rates. We detect no impact of the remaining modality and imple-
mentation variables for girls.
We also find take-home rations to improve concentration for younger and older
children (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). Although take-home rations are conditional on
girls’ attendance, all children within a household may well be benefiting from take-
home rations as, due to the value transfer to the household, children’s attendance
may improve as well as their nutritional status. We also find a longer program
duration to improve cognitive skills for younger children.
Material contributions appear to increase concentration for younger children. We
include firewood, water and labor in the materials category. Cash is usually con-
tributed towards the cooks’ remuneration. The reference category is no contribution
at all. On the other hand, cash contributions appear to adversely affect concentration
for older children. We should be cautious interpreting these findings, as we suspect
estimates on household contributions to suffer from endogeneity bias, possibly much
14In the sample of program school catchment area boys, the score has a mean of 136.7 and a
standard deviation of 56.6. See Table 2.12 in the Appendix.
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more than the other modality variables. Conditional on the school meals program
being in place, an implementation variable such as whether cooks are trained might
be more or less random and thus uncorrelated with the error term, at least when
controlling for other characteristics. On the other hand, households might arguably
have more flexibility to avoid contributions, which may depend on unobservable char-
acteristics. Of course, household contributions may also improve the availability of
resources that are complementary to the distribution of food, thereby reinforcing any
beneficial effect of school meals.
We interpret the results on take-home rations as weak evidence that not only
targeted girls benefit, but possibly all children within a household receiving take-
home rations.
Reading
We find take-home rations to improve reading skills for boys, both in terms of
being able to read a word and a sentence. Again, this finding is remarkable as take-
home rations are conditional on girls’ attendance. As explained above, boys may also
be benefiting from take-home rations as, due to the value transfer to the household,
boys’s attendance may improve as well as their nutritional status.
We find that girls are 10 percentage points (s.e.= 5.8%), or a quarter of a standard
deviation, more likely to be able to read a sentence if the CHILD component is in
place. Again, we find take-home rations to have a particularly large effect as we
find girls to be 31.7 percentage points (s.e.= 8.9%) more likely to be able to read
a sentence. Serving food at the end of classes, as opposed to earlier in the day, is
found to negatively affect reading skills, both in terms of being able to read a word
and a sentence.
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We find take-home rations to improve reading skills for younger and older chil-
dren. In addition, disruption in the distribution of food is found to negatively affect
reading skills for older children. Contributing cash appears to positively affect read-
ing for younger children.
Writing
We find take-home rations to positively affect writing for boys. We do not detect
impact on the remaining modality and implementation variables.
Take-home rations appear to have a large effect on writing for the girls, as we find
girls to be 35.1 percentage points (s.e.= 16.1%) more likely to be able to write, an
improvement by about 0.7 standard deviations. Any contribution (material or cash),
as opposed to no contribution at all, appears to improve writing skills for girls.
Take-home rations are also found to positively affect writing for younger and older
children, while we find the CHILD component to improve writing for older children.
Arithmetic skills
We find take-home rations to improve arithmetic skills for boys. Making any kind
of contribution (cash or material), as opposed to no contribution, is also found to
improve arithmetic skills for boys.
We find a disruption in the distribution of food to have an adverse effect on girls’
arithmetic skills. The timing of serving food also appears to be important for girls,
as we find food being served at the end of the school day having a less favourable
effect as opposed to food being served at the beginning of the school day. We do not
detect impact of take-home rations on girls’ arithmetic skills.
A food management committee that is trained appears to improve arithmetic
skills for older children, but not for the younger children as we even find a negative
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effect, which is puzzling. We find any kind of contribution (cash or material) to
improve arithmetic skills for older children.
In sum, we find that supplementing on-site meals with take-home rations posi-
tively affects concentration, reading, writing and arithmetic skills; we do not detect
impact on cognitive skills. We also find that training communities on how to im-
prove the school environment has a favourable impact on learning achievement and
cognitive development. Our results suggest that school meals are most effective if
they are served at the beginning of classes or half-way through; however, the timing
of serving food appears to be only important for girls. Moreover, we find household’s
material contribution to be beneficial, relative to no such contributions, with respect
to children’s learning achievement and concentration.
2.6.2 The impact of the school meals program
Tables 2.9-2.11 present results on the impact of school meals, separately for boys,
girls, and age groups, and also by asset holdings. To examine the effect of the pro-
gram itself, we use a binary school meals variable and a sample that includes children
from program school service areas as well as children from non-program school ser-
vice areas.15 In addition, as we found take-home rations to play an important role
as a variable of modality in Section 2.6.1, we are now interested in estimating in-
teraction effects with on-site school meals within a larger sample that also includes
non-program school service areas.
15As explained above, we choose not to condition on children’s enrollment status, effectively
estimating an average intent to treat effect (AIT).
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Cognitive skills, concentration and learning achievement
Table 2.9 presents the effect of school meals on cognitive skills, concentration,
and reading, writing and arithmetic skills, based on subsamples partitioned by the
child’s sex and age group.
We find no impact of school meals on cognitive skills as measured by the Raven’s
test, a finding similar to that of Vermeersch and Kremer (2005) and Adelman et al.
(2008a). Neither do we find an effect on concentration, reading or arithmetic skills.
On the other hand, if school meals are supplemented by take-home rations, we
find the program to have a negative effect on writing for younger children. As this
is the only effect we find on learning achievement, this result may well be due to
chance, given the large number of outcomes included in the analysis (see Table 2.9).
Overall, in contrast to the results on providing take-home rations in addition to
school meals presented in Section 2.6.1, we do not find any interaction effects. One
explanation for this result is that the problem of endogeneity may be more severe in
a sample that includes both program and non-program school service areas, masking
the impact of take-home rations.
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Children’s activities
Table 2.10 presents results on the impact of school meals on children’s activities.
If the program is supplemented by take-home rations, we find school meals to
increase time spent on the family business for older children; they spend an additional
0.83 hours per day (s.e.= 0.432) in program school service areas
We find school meals to increase boys’ time spent on domestic tasks. On the other
hand, the interaction between school meals and take-home rations has a negative
effect. We also find an increase in time spent on domestic tasks for older children;
they spend an additional 0.33 hours per day (s.e.= 0.194) in program school service
areas. Although the program is expected to increase participation in school, through
enhanced nutrition and improved physical capacity children may be increasingly
involved in other activities such as collecting firewood, possibly as part of household
contributions to the program.
We find a reduction in time spent on activities related to paid work for younger
children and, if the program is supplemented by take-home rations, also for older
children. This is consistent with the program changing children’s activities as a
result of the value transfer of the school meals program, in particular take-home
rations, rendering a household’s reliance on paid child labor less important.
We do not detect impact of school meals on time spent on caring for others.
Table 2.11 reports results from further analysis that examines the impact of school
meals on children’s activities. We partition the sample according to household asset
holdings, using median asset holdings as the cutoff point for classifying households
into low and high-asset households.
The positive effect on domestic tasks for boys noted earlier appears to be driven
by boys and younger children from low-asset households. Further, the negative effect
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Table 2.11: Impact of school meals on children’s activities, by asset holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Family business Domestic tasks Caring for others Paid work
Low-asset
Boys
School meals 0.510 0.654∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.071
(0.422) (0.220) (0.150) (0.163)
School meals x THR 0.368 -0.629 -0.588 -0.149
(0.756) (0.386) (0.359) (0.237)
Observations 360 360 360 360
Girls
School meals 0.132 -0.065 0.275 0.212
(0.320) (0.264) (0.224) (0.180)
School meals x THR -0.510 0.737∗ -0.853∗∗ -0.228
(0.374) (0.381) (0.399) (0.198)
Observations 336 336 336 336
Aged 7-10 years
School meals 0.239 0.388∗ 0.109 -0.106∗
(0.295) (0.212) (0.161) (0.063)
School meals x THR -0.221 0.256 -0.802∗∗ 0.057
(0.424) (0.321) (0.314) (0.087)
Observations 498 498 498 498
Aged 11-13 years
School meals 0.308 0.211 0.322∗ 0.505
(0.467) (0.280) (0.194) (0.365)
School meals x THR -0.036 -0.499 -0.339 -0.909
(0.636) (0.474) (0.388) (0.618)
Observations 193 193 193 193
High-asset
Boys
School meals -0.054 0.171 -0.080 -0.026
(0.313) (0.206) (0.123) (0.075)
School meals x THR 0.681 -0.302 0.271 -0.157
(0.526) (0.280) (0.391) (0.105)
Observations 406 406 405 405
Girls
School meals -0.124 0.213 0.083 -0.055
(0.275) (0.193) (0.186) (0.113)
School meals x THR 0.720 -0.529 0.216 0.074
(0.578) (0.379) (0.412) (0.132)
Observations 320 319 319 320
Aged 7-10 years
School meals -0.007 0.089 0.022 -0.041
(0.269) (0.177) (0.143) (0.052)
School meals x THR 0.461 -0.365 0.350 0.029
(0.544) (0.266) (0.364) (0.050)
Observations 463 462 461 462
Aged 11-13 years
School meals -0.180 0.384 -0.068 -0.019
(0.311) (0.260) (0.160) (0.125)
School meals x THR 1.053∗ -0.642 -0.041 -0.196
(0.535) (0.398) (0.355) (0.216)
Observations 258 258 258 258
* p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.
All regressions use child, household and regional controls. THR: Take-home rations.
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on time spent on paid work for younger children noted earlier appears to stem from
younger children in low-asset households. For older children, we find a positive effect
of schools meals on the amount of time they spend caring for others. On the other
hand, we find girls and younger children from low-asset households to spend less
time on activities related to caring for others if school meals are supplemented by
take-home rations.
In high-asset households, we find school meals to increase time spent on the family
business for older children if school meals are supplemented by take-home rations.
This result is consistent with opportunity costs of children’s time being larger in
households with larger livestock holdings and the program having a favourable effect
on physical capacity through enhanced nutrition. We do not detect impact on the
other children’s activities in high-asset households.
In sum, we find some evidence of a shift from market-related activities to domestic
activities which are potentially more compatible with school attendance. For older
children from high-asset households, we also find some evidence of spending more
time on the family business if the program provides take-home rations in addition to
school meals.
2.7 Conclusion
The effectiveness of school meal programs depends on how well these programs
are designed in terms of modality as well as how well they are implemented. However,
little is known about the role of school meals program modalities and the manner of
implementation on generating learning achievement and enhancing cognitive devel-
opment.
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This paper investigated the role of the Ethiopian school meals program, its modal-
ities and implementation on learning achievement, cognitive development and con-
centration/attention span in rural areas of the country. We found that supplementing
on-site meals with take-home rations positively affects concentration, reading, writ-
ing and arithmetic skills; we did not detect impact on cognitive skills. We also
found that training communities on how to improve the school environment has a
favourable impact on reading, writing and cognitive development. Our results sug-
gest that school meals are more effective if they are served at the beginning of classes
or half-way through; however, the timing of serving food appears to be only impor-
tant for girls. Moreover, we found household’s material contribution to be beneficial,
relative to no such contributions, with respect to children’s learning achievement and
concentration.
On the impact of the school meals program, we found no evidence that the school
meals program improves learning achievement, cognitive development or concentra-
tion. However, our findings suggest an increase in the time spent on domestic tasks
and a decline in the time children spend on paid labor. This is consistent with the
program changing children’s activities as a result of the value transfer of the school
meals program, in particular take-home rations, rendering a household’s reliance on
paid child labor less important.
Our findings show that a school meals program’s modalities and its implementa-
tion play an important role in terms of program effectiveness, even though this paper
could not provide evidence on the program’s cost-effectiveness. While we acknowl-
edge the limitations of our data, this paper provided some evidence on issues related
to modality and implementation that influence the extent to which a school meals
program can improve educational outcomes of some of the world’s poorest children.
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Appendix
Table 2.12: Summary statistics of outcomes, by program status
Program Non-program
Variable Names Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Both sexes
Raven’s test 12.61 3.44 12.88 3.62
Concentration 137.42 55.49 152.54 57.87
Reads word 0.38 0.49 0.44 0.50
Reads sentence 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.46
Writes 0.60 0.49 0.66 0.47
Math 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.50
Family business (hours/day) 2.78 2.65 2.40 2.55
Domestic tasks (hours/day) 2.22 1.73 2.10 1.69
Caring for others (hours/day) 0.86 1.49 0.89 1.49
Paid work (hours/day) 0.13 0.86 0.19 1.11
Girls
Raven’s test 12.79 3.45 12.90 3.62
Concentration 138.31 54.19 151.84 57.19
Reads word 0.32 0.47 0.40 0.49
Reads sentence 0.20 0.40 0.29 0.45
Writes 0.55 0.50 0.65 0.48
Math 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.50
Family business (hours/day) 1.99 2.34 1.77 2.21
Domestic tasks (hours/day) 2.44 1.77 2.44 1.78
Caring for others (hours/day) 1.22 1.73 1.11 1.62
Paid work (hours/day) 0.15 0.94 0.12 0.93
Boys
Raven’s test 12.47 3.43 12.87 3.62
Concentration 136.74 56.63 153.24 58.72
Reads word 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.50
Reads sentence 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47
Writes 0.64 0.48 0.66 0.47
Math 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50
Family business (hours/day) 3.42 2.71 2.97 2.70
Domestic tasks (hours/day) 2.05 1.67 1.79 1.54
Caring for others (hours/day) 0.57 1.19 0.68 1.33
Paid work (hours/day) 0.11 0.78 0.26 1.25
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CHAPTER III
Poor Eyesight and Educational Outcomes in
Ethiopia
3.1 Introduction
Poor health is recognized to be a major obstacle to the progress of developing
countries. Yet, little is known about the mechanisms linking health and development.
Poor eyesight, being one of the major health problems, is a considerable burden
in developing countries. Silver et al. (2009) estimate that 9 percent of school age
children have vision problems that could be corrected by eyeglasses. However, very
few children in developing countries wear eyeglasses. Children loose educational
opportunities if eyesight problems lead to low grade attainment and prevent better
learning outcomes.
Few studies have examined the role of vision impairment on educational outcomes
in developing countries. Gomes-Neto et al. (1997) find that poor vision increases
dropout, hinders grade promotion and decreases performance in achievement tests.
In a randomized controlled trial, Glewwe et al. (2012) investigate the role of provid-
ing eyeglasses to visually impaired students and find that for students who accepted
eyeglasses average test scores increased by 0.12 to 0.22 standard deviations, equiv-
alent to 0.33-0.5 years of additional schooling. Hannum and Zhang (2008), using
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propensity score matching to address selectivity of wearing eyeglasses, find that stu-
dents who wear glasses perform better on literacy and math tests, though not on
language tests, and are less likely to fail a class.
Myopia (nearsightedness), the most common refractive error, is influenced by
both environmental and genetic factors. Parents who have myopia tend to have
children with myopia. Environmental factors have been found to play a role, e.g.
a higher prevalence of myopia in urban areas has been documented in a number
of studies. One possible explanation for these different rates of prevalence could
be that children in urban areas spend more time reading and writing outside the
school compared to children in rural areas (Saw et al., 2001). On the other hand,
outdoor activities tend to decrease the prevalence of myopia. However, the roles
of environmental influences and genetic predisposition to myopia remain uncertain
(Mutti et al., 2002). For example, parents may pass on their inclination to reading
to their children rather than myopia itself.
While I expect uncorrected refractive errors to be detrimental to educational
attainment, e.g. due to difficulties of reading from the blackboard, the effect of
poor vision on educational attainment is difficult to isolate. In studies in Asia, the
correlation of prevalence of myopia and educational attainment has been found to be
positive (Au Eong et al., 1993; Tay et al., 1992), with educational attainment being
positively associated with household socioeconomic status. Angle and Wissmann
(1980) argue that vision can be affected by near-work activities, such as reading,
which are likely to be correlated with schooling outcomes. Students who study more
tend to have their eyesight deteriorate faster.
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This paper investigates the role of poor vision on educational outcomes using data
from high-poverty districts in rural Ethiopia. I explore the effect of poor eyesight on
dropout, grade repetition, learning achievement and cognitive development.
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the role of poor eyesight
across gender. Whereas other studies have looked at the impact of poor eyesight
of children, the gender dimension of poor eyesight on educational outcomes in de-
veloping countries has not been explored in the literature. In particular, the paper
investigates whether visually impaired girls are more likely to drop out from school. If
households view net returns to education to be lower for girls than for boys, then girls
will be more at risk of dropping out. In particular, when, possibly due to poor eye-
sight, school performance is low, girls’ net returns to continued schooling will be more
likely perceived to be negative, resulting in withdrawal from school. Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos (2004) find that returns to primary education are much higher for boys
than for girls.1
In Ethiopia, primary education lasts 8 years and is split into grades 1-4 (primary
first cycle) and grades 5-8 (primary second cycle). Secondary education is also di-
vided into two cycles. Grades 9-10 provide general secondary education and, upon
completion, students are streamed either into grades 11-12 as preparation for uni-
versity, or into technical and vocational education and training (TVET). This paper
focuses on the first cycle of primary education.
In many Sub-Saharan African countries, girls are much less likely to attend school
and to complete basic education. The largest female gender gaps tend to occur in
1However, at secondary education level girls have higher returns to education than boys
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). The focus of this study is on primary education. There
is substantial empirical evidence that the economic returns are high in developing countries. In
a study on Indonesia, Duflo (2001) finds returns to primary education to range between 6.8 to
10.6 percent, which is smaller than what Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) find for developing
countries.
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countries with low income and small overall participation in education (World Bank,
2012). In Ethiopia, there has been considerable improvement in primary education
net enrollment rates in the past decade. In the academic year 2010/11, in primary
education boys’ net enrollment rate is reported at 87 percent, the corresponding
figure for girls is 83.5 percent.2 In the first cycle (grades 1-4), net enrollment rates
are reported at 94 percent and 89.4 percent for boys and girls, respectively. In
the second cycle (grades 5-8), girls’ net enrollment rate is slightly larger than the
corresponding figure for boys, though at a much lower level at 47.9 and 46.6 percent
for girls and boys, respectively (Ministry of Education, 2011).
There is growing interest in the relationship between health and educational out-
comes. A positive correlation between health and education has been firmly estab-
lished in the literature. However, the causal relationship between health and educa-
tion remains uncertain (Eide and Showalter, 2011). First, health may causally affect
education. Children with stronger health may obtain more education (Behrman and
Rosenzweig, 2004). Second, education may causally affect health, resulting in declin-
ing morbidity and mortality (Lleras-Muney, 2005). Third, there may exist a third
omitted factor affecting both health and education, such as time preferences.
I begin with a conceptual discussion of the impact of poor eyesight and school per-
formance on school attainment. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 presents
the empirical specification and the results. Section 3.5 concludes.
2According to national education statistics, the gender gap has also narrowed considerably. In
2006/07, boys’ net enrollment rate is reported at 82.6 percent, the corresponding figure for girls is
75.5 percent (Ministry of Education, 2011).
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3.2 Conceptual framework
Schooling decisions can be characterized by parental decisions that are based on
net marginal returns to schooling. We can think of children that are enrolled having
positive net marginal returns to schooling while net marginal returns are negative for
those that are not enrolled. Moreover, at the time of enrollment, some children start
with relatively high positive net marginal returns while others start with (positive)
net marginal returns that are just at the margin and, furthermore, net marginal
returns are such that they are increasing with school performance.
When a child’s school performance is revealed to be low, as a consequence of poor
vision among other things, perceived net marginal returns may become negative,
which is more likely so for children whose net marginal returns were just at the
margin at the time of enrollment. Depending on perceived marginal returns to
schooling parents will then decide about the child’s continued education; parents
will keep the child in school if net marginal returns are perceived to be still positive,
or else withdraw the child from school.
Low school performance, as a consequence of poor vision among others, increases
the likelihood of non-promotion which in turn increases the likelihood of dropout
and repetition. If a child is not promoted to the next grade, parents may allow
the child to repeat a grade or withdraw the child from school, depending on the
perceived net marginal returns to education. Grade repetition may lead to lower
dropout in the future if it enhances subsequent learning achievement which in turn
increases net marginal returns to education. However, grade repetition may also
be a precursor to dropout. Retained students are taken out of their social group
which may be detrimental to their motivation; they might be mocked by their old
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and new peers and struggle harder to be socially accepted because they are older.
Thus, whether poor eyesight operating through grade repetition leads to more or less
subsequent dropout is not clear from a conceptual point of view. Nevertheless, as
poor vision increases the probability of non-promotion to the next grade, I expect
visually impaired children to be more likely to repeat at grade.
The model suggests that parents respond to poor performance at school differently
based on the ‘type’ of the child. Households may have beliefs about net marginal
returns being different for boys and girls. If net marginal returns to education for girls
are perceived to be lower than for boys, then, on average, at the time of enrollment
girls will start with perceived net returns that are lower than boys’ returns. If
performance at school is revealed to be poor, girls will be at higher risk of dropping
out because girls’ perceived net marginal returns to education will be more likely to
be negative.
Hence, in this paper I formulate the following testable hypotheses:
(i) Poor vision leads to higher probability of dropout.
(ii) Poor vision leads to higher probability of repeating a grade.
(iii) As a consequence of poor vision, girls are more at risk of dropping out than
boys.
3.3 Data and descriptive analysis
The data used in this paper come from a survey conducted in 2010 by the United
Nations World Food Programme (WFP) Country Office Ethiopia and the University
of Mannheim involving school catchment areas in food-insecure woredas (districts)
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in the four major regions of Ethiopia (Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray).3 Em-
ploying a two-stage sampling design, the survey sampled 200 school catchment areas
in the four regions of the country stratified by highland and pastoral areas (see Table
3.1).4 The second-stage sampling entailed sampling of ten children aged 7 to 13 years
per school catchment area who were either enrolled in school or not at the time of
the survey. This design feature of the survey allows for a richer analysis than sur-
veys that are based on the school only. It allows to investigate relationships within
the school service area, circumventing selection problems associated with children
enrolled in school based on unobserved characteristics. Only students enrolled in
grades 2 to 4 were included. The survey provides information on health, education,
learning, and child and household characteristics for close to 2000 children.
Table 3.1: Distribution of school catchment areas
Program Non-Program Phase-out All
Amhara highland 14 17 16 47
Oromia highland 14 14 12 40
Oromia pastoralist 12 13 7 32
Tigray highland 14 16 9 39
SNNPR highland 10 12 0 22
SNNPR pastoralist 5 5 0 10
Subtotal highland 52 59 37 148
Subtotal pastoralist 17 18 7 42
Total 69 77 44 190
In this paper, the analysis is conducted separately for the highland and the pas-
toralist areas of Ethiopia. The rationale to use these subsamples rather than the
3The original purpose of the survey was to study the impact of WFP’s school feeding program
on attendance and learning achievement including attention span and cognitive development. See
Chapter II in this dissertation and Haile et al. (2011).
4In Tigray and Amhara, WFP’s school feeding is operational in highland areas only. Overall,
the survey aimed to achieve the inclusion of one-third feeding schools (program schools), one-
third schools that had been phased out from the program and one-third non-program schools.
In SNNPR phase-out schools were not included, resulting in one-half program and one-half non-
program sampled school catchment areas in that region.
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whole sample is based on the argument that highland and pastoralist areas are
rather dissimilar in terms of education. In particular, pastoralist areas generally
exhibit lower enrollment rates and higher gender disparity, with some improvement
in the recent past.5 Since the study uses a measure of dropout that depends on
past school enrollment, school service areas with lower enrollment will by construc-
tion have a lower dropout prevalence. Furthermore, this study is based on a sample
which includes current and former school feeding service areas. Feeding schools in
pastoral school service areas provide take-home rations conditional on girls’ atten-
dance in addition to on-site school meals. Highland feeding schools do not offer such
take-home rations. Since this study examines the effect of poor eyesight along gender
lines, pooling highland and pastoral school catchment areas is not advisable. The
study is interested in the effect of poor eyesight on educational outcomes conditional
on children being enrolled in school, except for dropout for which I use current and
former students in the analysis.
To measure scholastic performance, I use test scores on children’s reading, writing
and arithmetic skills.6 Children were tested regardless whether they were enrolled
in school. For reading, children were asked to read pre-prepared letters, words and
sentences. In the writing test, children were asked to write down pre-prepared sen-
tences that the interviewer read aloud. Children were also tested on their arithmetic
skills using up to three different arithmetic questions. In all three cases, two different
versions of the tests were administered depending on the age of the children involved
– one set for children between the ages of 7 and 10 years and a more difficult set for
children between the ages of 11 and 13 years.
5See also Ministry of Education (2011).
6The survey adapted tests on reading, writing and arithmetic skills from the Young Lives project,
a longitudinal study conducted in four countries (Peru, Ethiopia, India and Vietnam).
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To measure children’s cognitive skills, I use the Raven’s Standard Progressive
Matrices (SPM) test. The major benefit of this test is that no formal schooling is
required to solve the questions. The test is a measure of problem solving ability and
consists of selecting bits with different shape and design to complete matrices. The
survey administered the first 25 questions of the Raven’s test, including problem sets
A and B.
To measure children’s eyesight, I use the Landolt C vision test. Landolt C is a
symbol that consists of a ring with a gap, thus looking similar to the letter C. The
gap could be on the left, right, bottom, or top of the ring. A table with 12 rows
of gradually smaller symbols was placed in front of the child. The child was then
asked to indicate the position of the gap. The first row corresponds to 10 percent of
normal eyesight coded as 0.1, the second row to 20 percent of normal eyesight coded
as 0.2 and so on. If the child could read the 10th row, this corresponds to normal
eyesight coded as 1.0. If the child could read beyond the 10th row, this corresponds
to 150 percent (11th row coded as 1.5) and 200 percent (12th row coded as 2.0) of
normal eyesight, respectively. The test was conducted separately for the left and the
right eye and, if the child wore glasses, separately with and without glasses.
I define poor eyesight as visual acuity score below 0.9 or, alternatively, 0.8 in one
or both eyes.7 Table 3.2 shows poor eyesight by age and student status. The share
of children with poor eyesight defined by a visual acuity score below 0.9 is 28 percent
and 16 percent if poor eyesight is defined by visual acuity below 0.8 in one or both
eyes. Virtually no children wore glasses.
7The visual acuity cutoff point 0.9 is in accordance with Glewwe et al. (2012) who chose their
cutoff point based on acceptance of offered eyeglasses. In their study, acceptance was poor among
children with a visual acuity score of 0.9. However, a majority of children with a visual acuity score
of less than 0.9 accepted the glasses.
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Table 3.2: Poor eyesight by enrollment status and age
Acuity < 0.8 Acuity < 0.9 N
Current and former students
7 years 0.14 0.31 49
8 years 0.17 0.31 252
9 years 0.16 0.27 283
10 years 0.14 0.26 455
11 years 0.20 0.28 148
12 years 0.18 0.30 210
13 years 0.17 0.22 184
All 0.16 0.27 1591
Non-students
7 years 0.20 0.37 75
8 years 0.16 0.26 73
9 years 0.16 0.28 32
10 years 0.16 0.34 38
11 years 0.07 0.29 14
12 years 0.00 0.17 24
13 years 0.17 0.22 23
All 0.16 0.30 285
All children
7 years 0.18 0.35 124
8 years 0.17 0.30 325
9 years 0.16 0.27 315
10 years 0.14 0.27 493
11 years 0.19 0.28 162
12 years 0.16 0.28 234
13 years 0.17 0.22 207
All 0.16 0.28 1876
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Angle and Wissmann (1980) argue that vision can be affected by individuals’
activities, in particular how much time they spent doing ‘near-work’. Near-work
activities, such as reading, are likely to be correlated with schooling outcomes poten-
tially making inference on the relationship between eyesight and schooling outcomes
spurious. Students’ vision may suffer from reverse causality as children who study
more will have their eyesight deteriorate faster. Refractive development is a dy-
namic process. During infancy and early childhood, the variability of refractive error
decreases progressively. Before start-of-school age, most children are functionally
emmetropic. Thereafter, the distribution of refractive error gradually shifts to more
myopia with increasing age, the incidence of myopia reaching its peak at around 9-12
years of age (Wojciechowski, 2011). However, it remains uncertain to which extent
near-work activities contribute to the shift towards more myopia with increasing age.
Table 3.2 is also informative about the relationship between poor eyesight and
age by enrollment status. For current and former students, the correlation between
poor vision and age is positive and insignificant (r = 0.01, p = 0.59) if poor eyesight
is defined by a visual acuity of less than 0.8 in one or both eyes. For never enrolled
children, the correlation is also positive and insignificant (r = 0.01, p = 0.9). If poor
eyesight is defined by a visual acuity of less than 0.9 in one or both eyes, for current
and former students, the correlation between poor vision and age is negative and
insignificant (r = −0.03, p = 0.21). For never enrolled children, the correlation is
also negative and insignificant (r = −0.02, p = 0.68). In sum, I do not find evidence
for a correlation between poor vision and age for current and former students.8
Additionally, Table 3.3 presents correlations between age and vision controlling
for confounding factors. Vision is scaled from 0.1 to 1.0 with values capped at 1.0.
8Neither do I find evidence for a correlation between poor vision and age if I restrict the sample
to currently enrolled students.
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Table 3.3: Dependent variable: Vision
Current and former students Never-enrolled students
All Highland Pastoral All Highland Pastoral
Child age 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.004 -0.007 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
Child sex male -0.006 0.002 -0.032 -0.024 -0.034 -0.000
(0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.026) (0.030) (0.053)
One parent went to school 0.004 -0.009 0.055∗∗ -0.007 0.005 -0.045
(0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.036) (0.040) (0.075)
Both parents went to school 0.024∗ 0.010 0.066∗∗ 0.007 0.057 -0.100
(0.012) (0.014) (0.028) (0.063) (0.080) (0.097)
Male headed household -0.014 -0.001 -0.054∗∗ -0.050 -0.057 -0.113
(0.012) (0.013) (0.024) (0.043) (0.058) (0.085)
Wealth index1 0.088∗∗ 0.080 0.119 0.013 -0.052 0.108
(0.044) (0.050) (0.080) (0.118) (0.160) (0.154)
Livestock index1 0.092 0.149 0.080 -0.134 0.675 -1.095
(0.142) (0.158) (0.288) (0.505) (0.519) (1.132)
Number of children in hh 0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.007 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.010 0.009 0.052 0.021 0.047 0.113
N 1410 1095 315 263 185 78
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
1 The wealth index and livestock index are defined on page 53 f.
The first three columns use current and former students while the last three columns
use never enrolled children. Results presented in Table 3.3 confirm the findings from
the simple correlations. I do not find evidence for a correlation between age and
eyesight.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present means of outcome variables by visual impairment
status in highland and pastoralist areas, respectively. Dropout is a dummy variable
that is one if a currently non-enrolled child attended school in the past and zero if
the child is currently enrolled. Grade repetition is also a dummy variable indicating
whether a student repeated a grade in the past, conditional on being a student. I use
this variable to investigate the likelihood of repeating a grade conditional on being
enrolled. Unfortunately, I am not able to investigate grade repetition among current
and former students as for the former students I lack the information of whether they
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics (means) of outcome variables in highland sample by
visual impairment
< 0.8 ≥ 0.8 p-value < 0.9 ≥ 0.9 p-value
Both sexes
Never enrolled 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.85
Dropout 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.14
Grade repetition 0.12 0.11 0.69 0.09 0.11 0.39
Cognitive test 13.29 13.23 0.83 13.45 13.17 0.24
Reading 0.45 0.45 1.00 0.45 0.45 0.86
Writing 0.64 0.67 0.44 0.60 0.68 0.01
Math 0.36 0.50 0.00 0.41 0.51 0.00
Girls
Never enrolled 0.09 0.12 0.41 0.12 0.12 0.90
Dropout 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.46
Grade repetition 0.11 0.12 0.68 0.10 0.13 0.39
Cognitive test 13.38 13.37 0.98 13.75 13.26 0.18
Reading 0.47 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.41 0.96
Writing 0.61 0.67 0.25 0.60 0.68 0.08
Math 0.36 0.50 0.01 0.38 0.51 0.01
Boys
Never enrolled 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.85
Dropout 0.11 0.07 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.21
Grade repetition 0.13 0.09 0.32 0.09 0.10 0.76
Cognitive test 13.21 13.12 0.81 13.22 13.10 0.69
Reading 0.43 0.49 0.28 0.49 0.48 0.86
Writing 0.66 0.66 0.97 0.60 0.68 0.04
Math 0.36 0.51 0.01 0.43 0.50 0.09
The p-value stems from a t-test of means comparison.
repeated a grade. As argued in Section 3.2, grade repetition and dropout are likely
to be interdependent. If grade repetition eventually leads to dropout, then grade
repetition will be systematically underestimated as these children are only recorded
as dropouts but not as repeaters.
In highland areas, Table 3.4 shows a higher incidence of children with poor eye-
sight experiencing dropout than with normal eyesight. Children with poor eyesight
are less often never-enrolled compared to children with normal eyesight. Cognitive
skills are measured on a scale between 0 and 25, indicating how many questions
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics (means) of outcome variables in pastoral sample by
visual impairment
< 0.8 ≥ 0.8 p-value < 0.9 ≥ 0.9 p-value
Both sexes
Never enrolled 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.34
Dropout 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.08
Grade repetition 0.08 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.13 0.63
Cognitive test 11.24 11.40 0.63 11.41 11.32 0.75
Reading 0.38 0.39 0.91 0.38 0.39 0.79
Writing 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.27
Math 0.52 0.39 0.01 0.52 0.35 0.00
Girls
Never enrolled 0.25 0.18 0.32 0.23 0.18 0.40
Dropout 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.06
Grade repetition 0.10 0.16 0.34 0.15 0.14 0.83
Cognitive test 11.13 11.46 0.47 11.38 11.37 0.99
Reading 0.35 0.31 0.57 0.36 0.30 0.41
Writing 0.42 0.54 0.14 0.43 0.56 0.10
Math 0.58 0.37 0.01 0.54 0.35 0.01
Boys
Never enrolled 0.25 0.19 0.41 0.22 0.20 0.62
Dropout 0.02 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.04 0.52
Grade repetition 0.07 0.10 0.51 0.07 0.11 0.35
Cognitive test 11.34 11.35 0.99 11.44 11.26 0.68
Reading 0.40 0.46 0.46 0.39 0.48 0.21
Writing 0.60 0.56 0.63 0.57 0.57 1.00
Math 0.47 0.40 0.33 0.49 0.35 0.05
The p-value stems from a t-test of means comparison.
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were correctly answered. Visually impaired children (using a cutoff acuity of 0.9)
in highland areas have a mean score of 13.45.9 Finally, reading, writing and math
are dummy variables indicating whether a child could read a word, write a simple
sentence and do basic calculations, respectively. Table 3.4 shows that visually im-
paired children perform worse in math and writing compared to children with normal
eyesight.
In pastoralist areas, Table 3.5 shows that dropout is generally small among chil-
dren with poor eyesight, while the share of never-enrolled children is high. Perfor-
mance in math is superior among children with poor eyesight. As discussed above,
several studies find a positive correlation between visual impairment and learning
achievement, children who spent more time on near-work activities may have their
eyesight deteriorate faster, which is one explanation why visually impaired children
may perform better in math.
Comparing Tables 3.4 and 3.5, dropout and never-enrolled status follow different
patterns across the two livelihood areas. In highland areas, dropout is larger among
children with poor eyesight and they are less often never-enrolled than children with
normal eyesight. In pastoralist areas, I find smaller dropout among children with
poor eyesight and they are more often never-enrolled than children with normal
eyesight.
Table 3.6 presents simple comparisons of means of covariates used in the analy-
sis by visual impairment. The wealth index is defined following Woldehanna et al.
(2008). In particular, the wealth index is defined as an unweighted average of ser-
vices and consumer durables. Services include availability of a pit toilet, whether
the household uses a certain type of fuel (kerosene, paraffin or gas) for cooking, as
9In pastoralist areas, children with a visual acuity of less than 0.9 have a mean sore of 11.41.
Generally, children in pastoralist areas score lower than in the highland areas (see Table 3.5).
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Table 3.6: Summary statistics (means) of control variables by visual impairment
< 0.8 ≥ 0.8 p-value < 0.9 ≥ 0.9 p-value
Highland
Child characteristics
Male 0.51 0.56 0.24 0.57 0.54 0.43
Chronic illness 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.04
Age 10.16 10.01 0.27 9.99 10.04 0.67
Young child (age ≤ 10) 0.59 0.67 0.04 0.64 0.66 0.51
Household characteristics
Number of children 3.63 3.77 0.26 3.84 3.73 0.26
Neither parent attended school 0.59 0.60 0.85 0.58 0.60 0.50
Male headed household 0.80 0.84 0.20 0.84 0.83 0.78
Wealth index 0.25 0.27 0.06 0.26 0.27 0.09
Livestock index 2.31 2.76 0.12 2.43 2.78 0.14
Food shortage occurs often 0.31 0.22 0.01 0.26 0.23 0.14
Pastoral
Child characteristics
Male 0.54 0.51 0.63 0.54 0.50 0.41
Chronic illness 0.07 0.06 0.65 0.06 0.07 0.62
Age 9.78 9.77 0.97 9.65 9.87 0.21
Young child (age ≤ 10) 0.75 0.71 0.51 0.77 0.69 0.06
Household characteristics
Number of children 4.43 4.34 0.61 4.37 4.35 0.90
Neither parent attended school 0.68 0.64 0.44 0.71 0.61 0.02
Male headed household 0.90 0.87 0.32 0.91 0.85 0.06
Wealth index 0.29 0.33 0.01 0.30 0.34 0.01
Livestock index 4.31 5.83 0.12 4.57 6.06 0.09
Food shortage occurs often 0.32 0.35 0.67 0.32 0.36 0.41
The p-value stems from a t-test of means comparison.
opposed to firewood or cow dung, and whether water is piped into own dwelling,
plot or yard. Consumer durables include radio, bicycle, cell phone, modern bed,
chair and table. I define the livestock index as the weighted average over cattle,
donkeys/horses, goats/sheeps and poultry using tropical livestock units as weights.
In highland areas, children with poor eyesight, defined by visual acuity of less
than 0.8 in at least on eye, suffer more often from a chronic illness than children
with normal eyesight. Visually impaired children live in households with a smaller
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livestock index. In addition, children with poor eyesight (visual acuity < 0.8) live
more often in households with self-reported food shortages occurring frequently than
children with normal eyesight. In pastoralist areas, children with poor eyesight
live in households with a smaller wealth index than children with normal eyesight.
In addition, the fraction of neither parent having attended school is larger among
children with poor eyesight (visual acuity < 0.9) than among children with normal
eyesight. Children with poor eyesight (visual acuity < 0.9) live in households with a
smaller livestock index.
Comparing highland and pastoralist children in terms of household characteris-
tics (see Table 3.14 in the Appendix), pastoralist children’s households have more
children, a larger fraction with neither parent having attended school, are more often
headed by a male household member, have a larger wealth and livestock index, and
report more often to have food shortages occurring frequently.
3.4 Empirical specification and results
3.4.1 Empirical specification
This paper is interested in identifying the effect of poor vision on schooling out-
comes. However, health is correlated with family and individual characteristics many
of which are not observed by the econometrician. The reduced form regression to be
estimated is:
(3.1) yis = X
′
isδ + βPVis + ηs + is,
I estimate the effect of individual i′s poor vision PVis who lives in school catchment
area s on her outcome yis using the fixed-effects model. Xis is an individual and
household specific vector of controls, ηs is a school fixed effect and is is the error
term.
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I control for household and individual characteristics to account for possible corre-
lation between eyesight and the error term. For example, I do not observe individual
(mal)nutrition – a variable that is likely to be correlated with eyesight. However, I
do observe household and individual characteristics that inter alia determine how
well an individual is able to cope with shocks to food availability. Furthermore, con-
trolling for wealth is mandated as wealthy households are more likely to invest more
in both health and education relative to poor households.
In the learning achievement related regressions, I control for whether a child is
aged between 7 and 10 years (a dummy variable) because the survey administered
different tests for younger and older children, except for the Raven’s test which
was administered irrespective of age. In small samples the distribution of younger
children might be unequal across visual impairment status.
The data at hand allow me to control for chronic diseases that the child might
have. This is relevant because chronic conditions might be correlated with poor
eyesight.10
In all regressions, I use school fixed effects which allow me to focus on within
school catchment area variation. Furthermore, I use robust standard errors corrected
for school catchment area cluster effects. Estimations for binary dependent variables
are based on the linear probability model.
While I acknowledge that the non-experimental and cross-sectional nature of the
data does not allow me to rule out correlation between visual impairment and the
error term, the strength of these data is their broad geographical coverage within
Ethiopia, as the data cover high-poverty districts of the four major regions of the
10However, this measure might actually include poor vision as households may perceive poor
vision as a chronic condition. I therefore reran all regressions without this control variable. Changes
in results are only minor.
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country. Other studies, e.g. Glewwe et al. (2012), attain stronger internal validity but
are more local in scale. The results obtained in this study provide some noteworthy
correlations that have not been looked at so far and may form the basis of future
studies.
3.4.2 Results
I first present results with respect to educational attainment and then proceed to
results on the effect of poor eyesight on cognitive development and learning achieve-
ment.
Educational attainment
Table 3.7 presents results on dropout for girls and boys by livelihood area.
Columns 1 and 2 show results for highland areas, while columns 3 and 4 show results
for pastoralist areas.
In highland areas, I find poor eyesight to have a positive effect on dropout for
girls. This effect is substantial. When their vision is poor, girls are 6.1 percentage
points (s.e.= 3.2%) more likely to drop out. For comparison, Gomes-Neto et al.
(1997) report an 8.6 percentage points higher probability of dropout. On the other
hand, boys do not appear to have a higher probability of dropout when their eyesight
is poor.
In pastoralist areas, the effect of poor eyesight on dropout appears to be negative
for girls, as I find girls to be 7.9 percentage points (s.e.= 3.2%) less likely to drop
out. It is worth noting that the results on dropout presented in this paper constitute
a lower bound for the effect of poor eyesight. As I expect the correlation between
poor eyesight and study time to be positive and the correlation between study time
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Table 3.7: Dependent variable: Dropout (cutoff acuity: 0.9)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight 0.061∗ 0.047 -0.079∗∗ 0.004
(0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035)
Child has chronic illness 0.109 -0.108∗∗∗ 0.077 0.127
(0.077) (0.034) (0.084) (0.109)
Child age 0.010 0.035∗∗∗ 0.010 0.004
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Food shortage often 0.060∗∗ 0.044 0.029 0.014
(0.029) (0.028) (0.021) (0.035)
Neither parent went to school 0.027 0.011 0.047 -0.036
(0.025) (0.029) (0.056) (0.030)
Male headed household -0.078∗ 0.011 -0.080 -0.056
(0.042) (0.040) (0.058) (0.068)
Wealth index -0.163 -0.046 0.014 -0.135
(0.102) (0.088) (0.155) (0.119)
Livestock index 0.008 0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of children in hh -0.014∗ -0.000 -0.002 0.033∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.097 0.059 0.156 0.104
N 552 637 156 161
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
and dropout to be negative, the estimates of the effect of poor eyesight on dropout
will be biased downward, implying that the ‘true’ effect is more positive.
Table 3.8 shows results on never-enrollment. From a conceptual point of view, it
is not clear whether parents are more likely to enroll a child that has normal eyesight
as opposed to a child with poor eyesight. According to the conceptual framework
outlined in Section 3.2, parents base their educational decisions on the marginal
returns to education net of of marginal costs. Consequently, parents may perceive a
child with poor eyesight to have lower opportunity costs as she may be considered to
be unfit for certain tasks, such a herding. On the other hand, parents may expect a
visually impaired child to do less well in school and therefore perceive the marginal
benefits to be lower.
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Table 3.8: Dependent variable: Never enrolled (cutoff acuity: 0.9)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight -0.026 -0.025 -0.037 -0.091
(0.035) (0.037) (0.074) (0.064)
Child has chronic illness -0.009 0.064 -0.112 0.035
(0.049) (0.075) (0.106) (0.143)
Child age -0.033∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.024) (0.018)
Food shortage often -0.030 0.051∗ -0.122∗ 0.060
(0.029) (0.030) (0.064) (0.078)
Neither parent went to school 0.089∗∗∗ 0.014 0.245∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.068) (0.085)
Male headed household -0.007 0.060 -0.014 -0.074
(0.043) (0.043) (0.101) (0.136)
Wealth index -0.186 -0.268∗∗ -0.428 -0.380
(0.115) (0.110) (0.266) (0.262)
Livestock index 0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Number of children in hh 0.017 -0.010 0.006 0.039∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.020) (0.017)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.059 0.067 0.187 0.244
N 622 749 195 198
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
In Table 3.8, I do not find an effect of poor eyesight on a child being never-
enrolled. One explanation is that lower perceived opportunity costs and marginal
benefits may balance out on average. The findings on the other covariates are in line
with expectations. The negative coefficient on the child’s age suggests that children
are less likely to be never-enrolled with increasing age, which is consistent with the
general fact that many children enter school at an age that is larger than the official
school entry age. Children with lower educational household background are more
likely to be never-enrolled and children from wealthier households are less likely to
be never-enrolled.
Table 3.9 presents results on grade repetition. Estimates on grade repetition
are conditional on being enrolled, i.e. based on a sample of current students. I
do not find an effect of poor eyesight on grade repetition. It should be noted that
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Table 3.9: Dependent variable: Repeated grade (cutoff acuity: 0.9)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight -0.026 -0.019 0.020 -0.008
(0.039) (0.029) (0.065) (0.078)
Child has chronic illness 0.046 0.022 0.118 0.168∗
(0.137) (0.076) (0.104) (0.088)
Child age 0.054∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.000 0.018
(0.012) (0.009) (0.020) (0.019)
Food shortage often 0.012 0.059 0.085 0.099
(0.041) (0.044) (0.081) (0.078)
Neither parent went to school -0.093∗∗∗ -0.042 -0.139∗ -0.029
(0.035) (0.031) (0.078) (0.051)
Male headed household -0.007 0.019 -0.181 0.027
(0.061) (0.038) (0.117) (0.058)
Wealth index -0.013 -0.226∗ -0.255 0.268
(0.124) (0.124) (0.259) (0.182)
Livestock index -0.005 0.000 0.004 -0.003
(0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Number of children in hh -0.002 0.021∗∗ 0.037 -0.012
(0.009) (0.010) (0.029) (0.013)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.081 0.056 0.111 0.091
N 513 576 151 156
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
selection bias is expected to play a more important role, changing the pool of students
potentially based on unobservables, in a sample that is restricted to current students.
As mentioned above, I am not able to investigate grade repetition among current and
former students as for the former students I lack the information of whether they
repeated a grade.
Overall, the results are suggestive that girls face a higher likelihood of dropout
when their eyesight is poor as opposed to boys who may continue their education
despite poor eyesight. These findings are consistent with a theory about households
making schooling decisions on perceived net marginal returns to education as was
argued in Section 3.2. Neither girls nor boys appear to be more likely to repeat a
grade when their eyesight is poor.
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Cognitive development and learning achievement
Results on cognitive development and learning achievement presented in Tables
3.10 to 3.13 are based on regressions using the sample of currently enrolled children.
Table 3.10 shows positive impact on cognitive skills, though only for highland
boys I find this effect to be statistically significant at the 10% level. As mentioned
above, enrollment, through time spent on near-work activities, may contribute to
poor eyesight. The resulting bias will be positive, if the correlation between poor
eyesight and enrollment11 is positive and there is a positive correlation between
enrollment and cognitive development. While generally the effect of poor eyesight
is expected to be negative, e.g. due to difficulties of reading from the blackboard,
because cognitive skills are a more general concept, the ability of reading from the
blackboard may be considered to be less crucial for cognitive skills than e.g. for
reading skills.
Turning to reading skills, Table 3.11 presents results on whether children are able
to read a word – a simple word for children aged 7-10 and a more difficult one for
children aged 11-13.12 Although the coefficient on poor eyesight is negative – except
for pastoralist girls –, it is never statistically significant.
Table 3.12 shows results on writing. I find the effect of poor eyesight to be
negative for girls and boys in highland and pastoralist areas, though not statistically
significant. As Table 3.7 showed a positive effect of poor eyesight on girl’s dropout
in highland areas, the two findings combined tentatively suggest that worse school
performance leads to larger dropout. Ideally, I would include learning achievement,
11Enrollment can be used as a proxy for near-work activities, in particular study time.
12Because the two test variants may be unbalanced across visual impairment status, the regres-
sions include a dummy that is one if the child was between 7 and 10 years old (it is zero if the child
was between 11 and 13 years old).
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Table 3.10: Dependent variable: Cognitive skills (cutoff acuity: 0.9)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight 0.605 0.663∗ 0.109 0.715
(0.400) (0.357) (0.462) (0.629)
Child has chronic illness 0.840 -0.411 0.352 -1.498∗
(0.957) (0.878) (1.012) (0.874)
Child age 0.239∗∗ 0.149 0.262∗ 0.196
(0.104) (0.102) (0.155) (0.181)
Food shortage often -0.578 0.063 -0.141 0.640
(0.382) (0.438) (0.422) (0.727)
Neither parent went to school -0.466 -0.750∗∗ 0.055 -0.740
(0.418) (0.361) (0.573) (0.574)
Male headed household 0.023 -0.440 0.545 -0.680
(0.510) (0.506) (0.754) (1.099)
Wealth index -1.286 -0.835 1.712 2.218
(1.521) (1.291) (2.477) (2.047)
Livestock index -0.011 0.068 -0.003 0.104∗∗
(0.082) (0.058) (0.011) (0.043)
Number of children in hh -0.023 0.091 -0.217 -0.216
(0.111) (0.107) (0.132) (0.144)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.032 0.028 0.072 0.106
N 496 551 143 149
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
such as writing, in the dropout regressions. However, as learning achievement itself is
an outcome of poor eyesight, it is not feasible to condition on learning achievement in
a regression of poor eyesight on dropout. Hence, I am not able to test the hypothesis
that worse learning achievement, as a consequence of poor eyesight, increases the
probability of dropout. However, the two findings combined are consistent with a
theory outlined in Section 3.2.
Table 3.13 presents results on arithmetic skills. I do not detect impact of poor
eyesight.
3.4.3 Robustness check
I reran all regressions using poor eyesight defined as visual acuity below 0.8 in at
least one eye. Results are shown in Tables 3.15-3.21 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.11: Dependent variable: Reading (cutoff acuity: 0.9)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight -0.049 -0.049 0.123 -0.042
(0.065) (0.052) (0.112) (0.105)
Child has chronic illness -0.093 -0.092 -0.071 -0.257
(0.106) (0.096) (0.156) (0.303)
Child age 0.080∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ -0.004 0.097
(0.021) (0.021) (0.067) (0.075)
Young child (age ≤ 10) 0.255∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.188 0.174
(0.076) (0.073) (0.211) (0.231)
Food shortage often 0.024 -0.043 -0.041 0.008
(0.044) (0.053) (0.094) (0.115)
Neither parent went to school -0.018 -0.025 -0.041 -0.305∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.038) (0.156) (0.106)
Male headed household -0.025 0.018 -0.053 -0.081
(0.053) (0.059) (0.175) (0.154)
Wealth index -0.002 0.129 0.385 0.844∗∗
(0.181) (0.180) (0.465) (0.407)
Livestock index 0.001 -0.009 -0.003 0.018∗∗
(0.015) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Number of children in hh 0.006 -0.019 0.009 -0.032
(0.017) (0.015) (0.039) (0.028)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.041 0.071 0.044 0.180
N 509 573 149 151
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.12: Dependent variable: Writing (cutoff acuity: 0.9)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight -0.079 -0.032 -0.051 -0.118
(0.048) (0.040) (0.118) (0.097)
Child has chronic illness 0.019 -0.076 0.066 -0.217
(0.032) (0.096) (0.154) (0.187)
Child age 0.046∗∗ 0.046∗∗ -0.058 -0.064
(0.021) (0.021) (0.065) (0.048)
Young child (age ≤ 10) 0.196∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ -0.375∗ -0.198
(0.075) (0.072) (0.221) (0.171)
Food shortage often 0.038 0.082∗ 0.070 -0.018
(0.044) (0.048) (0.103) (0.112)
Neither parent went to school -0.070 -0.015 0.066 -0.008
(0.043) (0.040) (0.113) (0.098)
Male headed household -0.076 -0.077 -0.147 0.328∗
(0.056) (0.049) (0.149) (0.182)
Wealth index 0.127 0.163 -0.085 0.170
(0.161) (0.156) (0.409) (0.372)
Livestock index -0.003 -0.003 0.009 0.018∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Number of children in hh 0.010 -0.017 -0.002 -0.033
(0.015) (0.016) (0.036) (0.032)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.046 0.035 0.096 0.132
N 509 573 149 151
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.13: Dependent variable: Math (cutoff acuity: 0.9)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight -0.046 -0.011 0.120 0.079
(0.056) (0.059) (0.096) (0.103)
Child has chronic illness 0.080 0.041 -0.307∗∗ -0.262
(0.101) (0.120) (0.137) (0.209)
Child age 0.080∗∗∗ 0.048∗ -0.029 0.075
(0.023) (0.027) (0.051) (0.061)
Young child (age ≤ 10) 0.699∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.213 0.753∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.093) (0.188) (0.162)
Food shortage often -0.059 -0.129∗∗ 0.138 -0.059
(0.056) (0.060) (0.086) (0.119)
Neither parent went to school 0.014 -0.018 0.048 -0.140
(0.052) (0.057) (0.108) (0.101)
Male headed household -0.125∗∗ -0.101 0.011 0.287∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.072) (0.111) (0.106)
Wealth index 0.039 0.134 0.049 0.218
(0.218) (0.176) (0.345) (0.351)
Livestock index -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.009
(0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Number of children in hh 0.003 0.002 -0.038 -0.047
(0.016) (0.017) (0.031) (0.033)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.251 0.103 0.153 0.346
N 509 570 149 151
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.15 presents results on dropout. The effect of poor eyesight is now larger
in magnitude for highland girls and less negative for girls in pastoralist areas. When
their vision is poor, I find girls in highland areas to be 8 percentage points (s.e.= 4%)
more likely to drop out. The stronger effect in terms of magnitude is as expected,
since worse eyesight should result in larger dropout. I do not detect impact for boys.
Table 3.16 shows results on never-enrollment. I do not detect impact of poor eyesight
on a child being never enrolled. According to Table 3.17, poor eyesight is negatively
related to grade repetition for pastoralist girls who appear to be 12.4 percentage
points (s.e.= 5.7%) less likely to repeat a grade. Table 3.18 shows positive effect on
cognitive skills for boys and girls in highland areas, suggesting that visually impaired
highland boys score 1 point (s.e.= 0.43) and girls score 0.85 points (s.e.= 0.51)
higher. The score has a mean of 13.21 and 13.38 (see Table 3.4) and a standard
deviation of 4.1 and 3.9 (not shown) among visually impaired highland boys and
girls, respectively. Table 3.19 suggests that poor eyesight adversely affects boys’
reading skills in highland areas. They are 13.9 percentage points (s.e.= 6%) less
likely to be able to read a word. Table 3.20 shows results on writing. I find girls in
highland areas to be 8.9 percentage points (s.e.= 4.9%) less likely to be able to write.
Results presented in Table 3.21 suggest that highland boys’ math skills are adversely
affected by poor eyesight. Visually impaired highland boys are 14.5 percentage points
(s.e.= 6.8%) less likely to be able to solve a simple arithmetic problem.
Overall, the results from the regressions using poor eyesight defined as visual
acuity below 0.8 in one or both eyes confirm the previous results which suggest
that girls face a higher likelihood of dropout when eyesight is poor. There is some
evidence that boys are kept in school, despite performance being lower due to poor
eyesight, as I still do not find an effect of poor vision on dropout, while learning
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achievement appears to be adversely affected. Moreover, results suggest that poor
vision has an adverse effect on writing for girls. The negative impact on reading,
writing and math is consistent with poor vision being more harmful with respect to
learning achievement that is relatively more ‘vision-intensive’.
3.5 Conclusion
Eyesight problems, which are mostly uncorrected, are prevalent among children
in developing countries. However, little is known about the impact of poor vision on
educational outcomes. Children loose educational opportunities if vision problems
result in low grade attainment and poor academic achievement.
This paper explored the role of poor vision on educational outcomes in rural
Ethiopia. I found that around 28 percent of children have poor eyesight. Of these
children, virtually no child wears eyeglasses. Results showed that poor vision in-
creases school dropout among girls. This effect is substantial. Girls that suffer from
poor eyesight have, depending on the definition of poor eyesight, a 6.1 or 8 percent-
age points higher probability of school dropout. Results also showed that learning
achievement is adversely affected by poor eyesight. The evidence is consistent with
a theory in which parents make educational decisions based on net marginal returns
to schooling.
This analysis is important for public policy. The evidence presented in this paper
lends some support to potentially large benefits if vision were to be corrected through
properly fitted eyeglasses, particularly with respect to girls’ educational attainment.
As low-cost eyeglasses are available, the cost-benefit ratio appears to be favourable
relative to other more costly interventions that may generate similar benefits.
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Appendix
Table 3.14: Summary statistics (means) of household characteristics by livelihood
Pastoral Highland p-value
Number of children 4.37 3.75 0
Neither parent attended school .66 .6 .03
Male headed household .88 .83 .01
Wealth index .32 .27 0
Livestock index 5.42 2.69 0
Food shortage occurs often .34 .24 0
The p-value stems from a t-test of means comparison.
Table 3.15: Dependent variable: Dropout (cutoff acuity: 0.8)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight 0.080∗∗ 0.061 -0.067∗∗ -0.002
(0.040) (0.041) (0.028) (0.031)
Child has chronic illness 0.105 -0.108∗∗∗ 0.093 0.128
(0.077) (0.035) (0.088) (0.108)
Child age 0.011 0.034∗∗∗ 0.012 0.004
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Food shortage often 0.059∗∗ 0.045 0.029 0.014
(0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.035)
Neither parent went to school 0.028 0.010 0.027 -0.034
(0.024) (0.029) (0.053) (0.025)
Male headed household -0.072∗ 0.009 -0.092 -0.055
(0.041) (0.041) (0.065) (0.064)
Wealth index -0.176∗ -0.043 -0.015 -0.135
(0.101) (0.087) (0.150) (0.118)
Livestock index 0.008 0.002 0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of children in hh -0.014∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.033∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.099 0.059 0.143 0.104
N 552 637 156 161
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.16: Dependent variable: Never enrolled (cutoff acuity: 0.8)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight -0.023 -0.050 0.010 0.005
(0.034) (0.040) (0.085) (0.057)
Child has chronic illness -0.007 0.067 -0.105 0.033
(0.049) (0.076) (0.106) (0.142)
Child age -0.033∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.018)
Food shortage often -0.029 0.050∗ -0.118∗ 0.053
(0.029) (0.029) (0.065) (0.077)
Neither parent went to school 0.089∗∗∗ 0.015 0.235∗∗∗ 0.149∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.062) (0.084)
Male headed household -0.008 0.061 -0.030 -0.096
(0.042) (0.043) (0.097) (0.135)
Wealth index -0.181 -0.270∗∗ -0.417 -0.370
(0.115) (0.110) (0.272) (0.260)
Livestock index 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Number of children in hh 0.017 -0.010 0.006 0.044∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.020) (0.017)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.059 0.068 0.186 0.233
N 622 749 195 198
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.17: Dependent variable: Repeated grade (cutoff acuity: 0.8)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight -0.053 -0.005 -0.124∗∗ -0.044
(0.056) (0.044) (0.057) (0.061)
Child has chronic illness 0.046 0.019 0.114 0.171∗
(0.136) (0.076) (0.099) (0.088)
Child age 0.054∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.006 0.019
(0.011) (0.009) (0.019) (0.017)
Food shortage often 0.013 0.058 0.079 0.099
(0.041) (0.044) (0.075) (0.078)
Neither parent went to school -0.094∗∗∗ -0.041 -0.113 -0.025
(0.035) (0.031) (0.079) (0.062)
Male headed household -0.009 0.019 -0.147 0.030
(0.061) (0.038) (0.117) (0.054)
Wealth index -0.007 -0.226∗ -0.280 0.270
(0.125) (0.124) (0.248) (0.181)
Livestock index -0.005 0.000 0.003 -0.004
(0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Number of children in hh -0.002 0.021∗∗ 0.036 -0.013
(0.009) (0.010) (0.029) (0.013)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.083 0.056 0.132 0.096
N 513 576 151 156
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.18: Dependent variable: Cognitive skills (cutoff acuity: 0.8)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight 0.846∗ 0.998∗∗ 0.200 0.154
(0.511) (0.432) (0.463) (0.657)
Child has chronic illness 0.805 -0.402 0.324 -1.527∗
(0.965) (0.866) (1.017) (0.844)
Child age 0.244∗∗ 0.133 0.263∗ 0.156
(0.105) (0.102) (0.154) (0.175)
Food shortage often -0.590 0.072 -0.135 0.658
(0.377) (0.441) (0.415) (0.697)
Neither parent went to school -0.457 -0.764∗∗ 0.072 -0.526
(0.415) (0.360) (0.612) (0.575)
Male headed household 0.071 -0.459 0.536 -0.523
(0.512) (0.502) (0.725) (1.139)
Wealth index -1.450 -0.840 1.771 2.079
(1.531) (1.291) (2.491) (2.123)
Livestock index -0.011 0.064 -0.003 0.109∗∗
(0.083) (0.058) (0.012) (0.045)
Number of children in hh -0.023 0.095 -0.217 -0.234
(0.111) (0.107) (0.134) (0.143)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.034 0.031 0.073 0.094
N 496 551 143 149
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.19: Dependent variable: Reading (cutoff acuity: 0.8)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight 0.045 -0.139∗∗ 0.035 -0.080
(0.073) (0.060) (0.101) (0.131)
Child has chronic illness -0.089 -0.079 -0.090 -0.250
(0.096) (0.098) (0.153) (0.310)
Child age 0.080∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ -0.004 0.095
(0.022) (0.020) (0.068) (0.076)
Young child (age ≤ 10) 0.257∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.165 0.160
(0.075) (0.071) (0.219) (0.239)
Food shortage often 0.020 -0.043 -0.042 0.006
(0.044) (0.052) (0.096) (0.116)
Neither parent went to school -0.015 -0.022 0.002 -0.303∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.038) (0.141) (0.103)
Male headed household -0.027 0.023 -0.019 -0.082
(0.053) (0.058) (0.168) (0.154)
Wealth index 0.008 0.125 0.416 0.845∗∗
(0.182) (0.178) (0.482) (0.402)
Livestock index 0.002 -0.009 -0.004 0.018∗∗
(0.015) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Number of children in hh 0.004 -0.020 0.006 -0.034
(0.017) (0.015) (0.038) (0.028)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.040 0.080 0.034 0.184
N 509 573 149 151
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.20: Dependent variable: Writing (cutoff acuity: 0.8)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight -0.089∗ 0.004 -0.082 -0.007
(0.053) (0.049) (0.137) (0.107)
Child has chronic illness 0.025 -0.083 0.075 -0.227
(0.033) (0.093) (0.158) (0.194)
Child age 0.044∗∗ 0.047∗∗ -0.060 -0.052
(0.021) (0.021) (0.065) (0.048)
Young child (age ≤ 10) 0.193∗∗ 0.148∗∗ -0.385∗ -0.179
(0.075) (0.073) (0.216) (0.172)
Food shortage often 0.039 0.080∗ 0.067 -0.025
(0.043) (0.048) (0.103) (0.115)
Neither parent went to school -0.071 -0.014 0.059 -0.054
(0.043) (0.040) (0.112) (0.091)
Male headed household -0.081 -0.077 -0.146 0.297
(0.056) (0.050) (0.149) (0.187)
Wealth index 0.143 0.163 -0.115 0.192
(0.161) (0.158) (0.401) (0.382)
Livestock index -0.004 -0.003 0.009 0.017∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Number of children in hh 0.010 -0.017 -0.001 -0.029
(0.015) (0.016) (0.036) (0.032)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.045 0.033 0.099 0.120
N 509 573 149 151
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.21: Dependent variable: Math (cutoff acuity: 0.8)
Highland Pastoral
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Poor eyesight -0.031 -0.145∗∗ 0.106 0.028
(0.067) (0.068) (0.100) (0.101)
Child has chronic illness 0.084 0.063 -0.327∗∗ -0.259
(0.101) (0.119) (0.142) (0.209)
Child age 0.079∗∗∗ 0.045∗ -0.026 0.069
(0.023) (0.027) (0.052) (0.060)
Young child (age ≤ 10) 0.698∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.236 0.746∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.093) (0.191) (0.163)
Food shortage often -0.060 -0.126∗∗ 0.141 -0.055
(0.055) (0.059) (0.086) (0.119)
Neither parent went to school 0.014 -0.016 0.080 -0.115
(0.052) (0.058) (0.102) (0.091)
Male headed household -0.128∗∗ -0.096 0.028 0.305∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.072) (0.114) (0.105)
Wealth index 0.049 0.130 0.096 0.205
(0.216) (0.176) (0.348) (0.346)
Livestock index -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.010
(0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Number of children in hh 0.003 -0.001 -0.041 -0.049
(0.017) (0.017) (0.032) (0.032)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.250 0.112 0.150 0.342
N 509 570 149 151
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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CHAPTER IV
The Impact of Financial Literacy Training on Risk
Management, Over-indebtedness and
Vulnerability
4.1 Introduction
Microfinance has been growing rapidly in recent years which has allowed more
poor people to benefit from microfinance services, especially micro-credit. Yet many
clients are at risk or have already become over-indebted. Development practitioners
claim that loan recipients default on their loan obligations due to incapacity to
manage the businesses they started and inability of businesses to earn enough profit,
hence leading to business failure.
Financial literacy levels are considered to be low among households in developing
countries. Financial education addresses this weakness by teaching people how to
save more, spend carefully, borrow prudently, and manage their debt with discipline.
The provision of financial education aims to prevent or reduce risk, in particular
over-indebtedness of microfinance clients.
From the perspective of a microfinance institution, it is hoped that better skilled
clients, aware of their needs, will help to adapt or modify a microfinance institution’s
products to make them more appropriate for its clients. Insurance and savings prod-
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ucts can then be better tailored to the client’s actual needs. Introducing financial
literacy or entrepreneurship training, by helping to reduce business failure and in-
creasing income and profits, may also help to avoid repayment problems. Thus, as
clients are able to better manage their loans and financial flows more generally, the
quality of a microfinance institution’s loan portfolio improves.
Few studies have examined the role of financial education on microfinance insti-
tutions’ or poor borrowers’ outcomes in developing countries. Drexler et al. (2010)
compare two training programs in terms of content implemented in the Dominican
Republic. They find that financial literacy training based on ‘rules of thumbs’ is
superior to more principles-based training. In India and Indonesia, Cole et al. (2011)
investigate the relative importance of financial literacy and monetary incentives for
the demand of financial services. While failing to find an overall effect, financial
literacy education has a modest effect on the likelihood of opening a bank account
for uneducated and financially illiterate households. On the other hand, monetary
incentives have a much larger effect on the likelihood of opening a bank account.
A much larger number of studies investigates the role of financial literacy in de-
veloped countries. Lusardi and Mitchel (2007) find that households with low levels of
financial literacy tend not to plan for retirement; Lusardi and Tufano (2008) find that
these households borrow at higher interest rates. Participation in the stock market
is also found to be lower among households with low levels of financial literacy (van
Rooji et al., 2007). In a randomized experiment, Duflo and Saez (2003) find that
even among highly educated staff at a United States university, encouraging indi-
viduals to attend an information fair has a strong effect on enrollment in retirement
plans.
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More recently, a number of impact evaluations have examined the role of busi-
ness training for micro and small enterprises. These studies are based on the idea
that poor management is a major constraint in developing countries.1 In a study
conducted in Peru, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) find positive impact of business train-
ing on business knowledge, practices and revenues. The microfinance institution also
benefited through higher repayment and client retention rates. Bruhn and Zia (2012)
find a business and financial training for young entrepreneurs in Bosnia to improve
business practices, but not firm survival. de Mel et al. (2012) evaluate the Inter-
national Labour Organization’s Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) program.2
They find the program to improve business practices and to increase profitability.
However, the latter effect is confined to business start-ups, as opposed to existing
businesses. Klinger and Schu¨ndeln (2011), who investigate a business training that
is based on a business plan competition, find the training to positively influence
business start-up as well as expansion of an existing business. Mano et al. (2012)
provide evidence for a business training, conducted in an industrial cluster in Ghana,
to improve business practices. Among these studies, there appears to be a consensus
that training participants improve business practices. On the other hand, empirical
evidence on business survival and profitability is much less clear.
In this paper, the training interventions under investigation differ with respect
to the modality as to how they deliver financial education. First, financial liter-
acy training is integrated into regular meetings between clients and credit officers.
Appropriately trained credit officers spend more time to explain and process appli-
cations of their clients and financially advice them during the loan cycle. Second,
1For an overview of recent impact evaluations on business training see McKenzie and Woodruff
(2012).
2In the Philippines, the present paper explores the International Labour Organization’s Generate
Your Business (GYB) and Start Your Business (SYB) programs.
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financial education is delivered through extra training sessions. Training courses
are organized during evenings, weekends or holidays as to accommodate client and
staff schedule. A further modality refers to the voluntariness of the training. Mi-
crofinance institutions offer the training on a voluntary basis, encouraging clients to
attend, or make the training mandatory during group meetings or for new clients
and those applying for a re-loan. None of the training interventions charged a fee for
participation.
This paper contributes to the literature by comparing four financial training pro-
grams which were implemented in three countries (Cambodia, the Philippines and
Vietnam). While one intervention teaches business skills, the other three interven-
tions focus on more general financial literacy. In all four training interventions, the
majority of participants are self-employed. We expect the training to improve fi-
nancial attitudes, translating into sound financial behavior. Through enhanced risk
management strategies, broadly defined as improved financial behavior including as-
set building, the training aims to help participants to avoid over-indebtedness and to
reduce their vulnerability. We use household survey data collected in several rounds:
one baseline survey and two to four follow-up surveys. We also use administrative
data obtained from the microfinance institutions’ management information systems.
The paper’s main findings are that financial training somewhat improves financial
attitude. Although we find evidence for the training to improve financial behavior, we
also find a worsening in several financial behavior indicators. We find evidence for the
training to positively affect the building of assets. Results also suggest that financial
education improves loan repayment despite evidence for increased borrowing. We find
a negative treatment effect on the ability to cover planned or unforeseen expenses.
However, as a result of the training, clients might be better aware as to whether they
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are able to cover their planned or unforeseen expenses. We find little evidence on
the use of improved coping mechanisms in response to shocks.
4.2 The ILO Microfinance for Decent Work action research
4.2.1 Introduction
Microfinance is generally considered to generate positive effects on incomes of the
self-employed. However, much less is known about its impact on other aspects of
labor for the working poor, e.g., child labor, safe working conditions, and wages and
incomes that are sufficiently high; to allow setting money aside as protection against
risk and to reduce vulnerabilities.
The Microfinance for Decent Work (MF4DW) action research aims at building
knowledge about the impact of microfinance on clients’ livelihoods. Launched by
the International Labour Organization (ILO) Social Finance Programme in 2008,
the MF4DW action research started by identifying specific work-related challenges
among microfinance clients and how to address them, implementing innovations with
16 microfinance institutions (MFIs) from 14 countries in Asia, Africa and South
America. The MF4DW action research, scheduled to conclude in 2012, set out to
apply an experimental research design to measure the impact of these innovations.
At the outset of the MF4DW action research, each participating MFI conducted
a diagnostic survey among 200 of its clients to determine their most pressing work-
related challenges. The analysis was guided by ILO’s vision of decent work for all
and its goal to promote opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and pro-
ductive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity. Within
this framework, the diagnostic determined child labor, working conditions, formal-
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isation, job creation and productive employment, risk management, and women’s
empowerment, as key challenges for microfinance clients to obtain decent work.
Informed by the diagnostic results, each MFI developed an innovation to address
the work-related challenge that most affected its clients and started implementing
the innovations from 2009 onwards. The innovations included new or upgraded
• financial services (loan, savings, insurance, leasing),
• non-financial services (training, awareness campaign), or
• mechanisms for delivering services (organisational restructuring).
This paper presents the results of financial education that addresses microfinance
clients’ challenges in terms of risk management, conducted by one MFI in Vietnam,
one MFI in the Philippines and two MFIs in Cambodia.3 The financial education
programs differ with respect to content and as to how the training was delivered.
Financial education intends to generate social and economic impact on client
households. We expect the training to improve financial attitudes, translating into
sound financial behavior. Through enhanced risk management strategies, broadly
defined as improved financial behavior including asset building, the training aims to
help participants to avoid over-indebtedness and to reduce their vulnerability.
4.2.2 Financial education with an emphasis on microinsurance
The Vietnamese MFI implemented financial education with an emphasis on mi-
croinsurance. It is one of the largest MFIs in Vietnam; it has 17 branches and
operates in 10 provinces in the North and Center of the country. As of December
3For each financial education intervention, we first drafted a report jointly with staff from the
International Labour Organization. As the MF4DW action research has not been concluded yet,
we do not refer by name to the four microfinance institutions involved in financial education.
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2011, it serves over 70,000 women. The MFI provides a range of financial services
such as group and individual loans, savings products, insurance and training, mostly
in rural areas of Vietnam. It conducted the MF4DW action research in two provinces:
Hanoi province and Nam Dinh province. The MFI’s branches in these two provinces
were selected as they tend to have comparable characteristics. They are both in rural
areas and were created in 1999, their clients are engaged in similar economic activi-
ties, the average loan amount, the dropout and repayment rates are rather close. Me
Linh 7 branch (Hanoi province) forms the target group while Y Yen 8 branch (Nam
Dinh province) forms the control group.
The diagnostic showed that clients’ understanding of risk management and of the
role of different financial products, in particular the MFI’s microinsurance product,
in managing risks is still low. As a result, clients’ strategies to cope with risk are
not optimal and unforeseen shocks can have negative impact on their livelihoods. In
an earlier attempt to improve the situation of its clients, the MFI had introduced a
credit life insurance product as well as health and death benefits to its clients (in-
cluding spouse and children). However, given the limited benefits and low awareness
among clients, the product was not able to sufficiently cover health and death re-
lated expenses and thus mitigate financial pressure. In an effort to better address the
needs of its clients and offer meaningful benefits, the MFI upgraded its microfinance
product in early 2009.
To support the introduction of the upgraded microinsurance product, and to
address the low awareness among its clients about the use of insurance and other
risk management strategies, the MFI introduced an integrated client training on
risk management and microinsurance. The training aims to equip clients with skills
and knowledge on risk management to make informed and sound financial decisions
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about spending, borrowing, saving, and using insurance. The curriculum covered
five topics:
1. Introduction to risk management
2. Saving
3. Concept of insurance
4. Insurance terms and types of common insurance
5. Use of the insurance product offered by the MFI
The MFI’s target branch staff delivered 59 two half-day training courses to 1567
clients of the target branch. The training courses were held during weekends and
holidays to accommodate staff schedule. Once all target branch clients had received
the two half-day training course, the branch staff delivered briefing sessions at the
end of weekly and monthly client meetings to refresh the clients’ knowledge on the
five training topics and to reinforce client skills. After the regular client meeting
activities had been completed (such as collecting loan repayments and savings), the
branch staff reiterated the key messages of one of the five training topics using
participatory methods and visual aids. Each briefing session lasted 15 to 20 minutes.
4.2.3 Financial education with an emphasis on entrepreneurship
In the Philippines, the microfinance institution participating in the MF4DW ac-
tion research implemented financial education focussing on entrepreneurship. The
MFI found that many clients default on their loan obligations due to incapacity to
manage the businesses they started and the inability of businesses to earn enough
profit, hence leading to business failure. It also found that clients often view the loan
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as a consumption loan rather than for use in enterprise start-ups. Financial educa-
tion focussing on entrepreneurship aims to improve business management, thereby
reducing business failures. Thus, the training is expected to help clients to increase
profit and income to avoid repayment problems.
The entrepreneurship training was conducted using ILO’s microfinance version
of the GYB-SYB tools for the Philippines. The Generate Your Business (GYB)
part of the training was delivered through a one-day training course. Its primary
purpose is to help clients generate business ideas and business plans. The Start Your
Business (SYB) part of the training was conducted after the clients received the loan,
delivered during center meetings and provided training on bookkeeping, budgeting
and marketing.
New clients and those applying for a re-loan were required to undertake the
training to help them generate feasible business ideas and educate them on the
basics of entrepreneurship. The business plan was evaluated before approving the
loan application.
The microfinance institution implemented the training in one branch in Negros
Occidental, a second branch in the same province forms the control group. It was
estimated that the targeted number of clients in the target and control groups could
be reached after 2.5 months based on the average number of clients applying for the
first time or renewing a business loan.
4.2.4 Financial education delivered through interaction with credit offi-
cers
The Cambodian MFI implemented financial education through interaction be-
tween credit officers and clients during regular meetings. The MFI has branches in
every province throughout the country and, as of December 2011, serves over 280,000
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clients with a staff of nearly 1,000. It provides a wide range of financial services such
as group and individual loans, savings products and money transfer, mostly in ru-
ral areas of Cambodia. The MFI conducted the MF4DW action research in two
provinces: Kompong Cham and Kompong Thom. The MFI’s branches that span
these two provinces were selected as they tend to have comparable characteristics in
terms of loan size per client, dropout rate and the percentage of portfolio at risk.
Kompong Cham branch provides the target group while Kompong Thom branch
provides the control group.
The MFI observed a sharp increase in repayment difficulties and over-indebt-
edness of its clients in early 2009. It suspected a number of contributing factors,
in particular the economic crisis, rapid growth of the microfinance industry and
possibly weak internal assessment processes. The MFI believes that these problems
were exacerbated by clients’ limited knowledge and skills on financial management
which prevented them to make informed financial decisions and adopt sound risk
management strategies.
To address the client’s risk management and over-indebtedness challenges, the
MFI first introduced an internal financial training program. The training targeted
MFI staff at central and branch level with the expectation that trained field staff will
be in a better position to advise clients, through group and individual counselling,
on financial matters including risk management and over-indebtedness. The inter-
nal financial education program was based on the ILO financial education trainer’s
manual for Cambodia. The curriculum included eight financial education topics:
1. Setting goals and how much it costs to reach them
2. Managing your money
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3. Debt or equity financing
4. The dangers of over-indebtedness and default
5. Comparing savings devices
6. Making a budget
7. Staying within your budget
8. Managing a savings plan
Client officers of the target branch provided individual and group counselling
to their clients on the eight financial education topics during regular interactions
with them, such as application process, monthly payment collection meetings, and
individual follow-up meetings.
4.2.5 Financial education delivered through a two-day training course
The second Cambodian MFI implemented a two-day financial education training.
Being one of the leading MFIs in Cambodia, it has 11 branches and operates in 19 of
the 24 provinces of the country. As of December 2011, it serves over 132,000 clients.
It provides a wide range of financial services such as group and individual loans,
savings products, safety net programs and training, mostly in rural areas. The MFI
conducted the MF4DW action research in three provinces: Kompong Chnang, Kan-
dal and Kompong Thom. The branches in these three provinces were selected as they
tend to have comparable characteristics. Kompong Chnang and Kandal branches
provide the target group while Kompong Thom branch provides the control group.
The financial education training was based on the ILO’s financial education trainer’s
manual for Cambodia. The ILO training curriculum aims to equip households with
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skills and knowledge on financial management. It covers the eight financial education
topics mentioned above (see Section 4.2.4). Trainers from the MFI’s central training
department delivered a two-day training course to 1004 clients in target branches of
Kandal and Kompong Chnang provinces.
4.3 Data
Data were collected through a questionnaire which is similar for all four financial
education programs, covering socio-demographic information on the client’s house-
hold; household income; household expenditures; money management; business reg-
istration; savings and insurance; loan and indebtedness information; unforeseen ex-
penses; and situational questions covering financial attitude and behavior. In addi-
tion, we use management information system (MIS) data obtained from the micro-
finance institutions, in particular we use data on the clients’ borrowing history.
Data were collected during a baseline survey before the start of the training
and in two to four follow-up surveys. Table 4.1 presents the sample size for each
financial education training. Except for Cambodia 2, data were collected in one
target branch and one control branch. In Cambodia 2, two branches form the target
group and one branch forms the control group. Study branches were pre-selected by
the microfinance institutions on the basis of being similar along a set of observable
characteristics. Branches span entire provinces or districts of a country.
In Vietnam, attrition was very low (less than 1% in the treatment group and
3.6% in the control group), while it was much larger in Cambodia 2 (30.3% in target
branch 1, 27.6% in target branch 2 and 18.3% in the control branch). In Cambodia 2,
the area of study has been subject to flooding which made it difficult for the survey
team to reach the clients. If attrition leads to a selected sample over time, this will be
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Table 4.1: Sample size
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
TB CB TB CB TB CB TB 1 TB 2 CB
Baseline 499 499 359 421 600 600 267 286 607
Follow-up survey 1 500 498 188 396 517 510 215 220 495
Follow-up survey 2 499 495 320 380 456 486 186 207 496
Follow-up survey 3 499 486 382 424
Follow-up survey 4 496 481 365 369
Notes: TB: Target branch, CB: Control branch.
of concern to our study. As long as attrition is based on observable characteristics,
we can solve this issue by including covariates in the analysis. However, concerns
remain that attrition is also based on unobservable characteristics.
Tables 4.7-4.10 (in the Appendix) report key socio-economic and financial char-
acteristics before the start of the training. Unfortunately, treatment and control
groups are not always observably similar along these characteristics. We find the
two groups to be similar along most variables in the Philippines (Table 4.8), whereas
they are observably different along a number of variables in Vietnam (Table 4.7).
Such differences may occur if the branches under study were less comparable
than anticipated, exacerbated by the small number of branches among which ran-
domization took place. Therefore, it is important to control for characteristics in the
analysis, accounting for differences in characteristics before the training began.
4.4 Empirical specification and results
4.4.1 Empirical specification
In each case, target and control branches were selected randomly from a pool of
pre-selected branches. As randomization was performed at the level of the branch,
the variable of interest, whether a client participated in training, only varies at the
branch level. Given resources, capacities and time constraints, the MF4DW action
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research opted for the introduction of the innovation at branch level rather than at
the level of the individual or the village. Unfortunately, the number of branches is
small (see Table 4.1).
For the quantitative evaluation of the training, we employ a difference-in-differ-
ences methodology similar to Card and Krueger (1994). The fact that the training
varies only at the branch level circumvents unobserved heterogeneity at the individual
level. However, this only shifts the selection problem up to the branch level. The
difference-in-differences approach yields causal effects of the training if the branches
(or treatment and control groups) follow a common trend, which is the key identifying
assumption.4 However, we have little information on how factors at the branch level
may have affected outcomes, e.g. local changes in economic policy or other economic
conditions or extreme weather conditions affecting one branch but not the other.
Given the small number of units over which randomization took place, unobserved
time-varying factors at the branch-level, e.g. differential exposure of branches to
shocks, remain an issue as they may introduce bias.5
We define the dependent variable Yijt as the outcome of interest for client i in
the control or target group j = 0, 1, respectively at time t = 0 up to t = 4. The
innovation is introduced in t = 1 in the target group and remains active in all
subsequent periods of time. Prior to t = 1 no innovation is in place.
We use the following regression formulation of the difference-in-differences ap-
proach, specifying a linear model to estimate the training effect:
(4.1) Yijt = α + γTj + λdt + β(Tj ∗ postt) + uijt,
4There must also be no contamination of the target group to the control group. Given that
the geographic distance between selected branches is usually rather large, this assumption does not
appear to be problematic.
5These unobserved time-varying factors specific to the branch would average out over a large
number of branches. Randomization at the individual level would also resolve such issues.
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where Tj is a binary indicator that is group-specific and fixed over time, in particular
Tj is equal to one for any branch pertaining to the target group and zero for any
control group branch. dt is a vector of time dummies common across groups and
varying over time. The coefficient β on the interaction between the group dummy Tj
and postt gives the average treatment effect; postt is a binary indicator equal to one
for all time periods after the introduction of the training. As most of the outcomes
are binary variables we use the linear probability model.
If we consider only two time periods, for example t = 0, 1, the above regression
formulation of the difference-in-differences approach yields double differences in sam-
ple means, that is the difference in outcomes across treatment and control group and
over time periods: DD = (Y¯11− Y¯10)− (Y¯01− Y¯00), where Y¯jt is the average outcome
over individuals i within group j and period of time t.
We modify the basic specification in equation (4.1) to check the stability of our
estimated coefficients. Our biggest concern is the possibility of omitted variables
at the branch and wave level. In addition to the regression without controls as in
equation (4.1), we therefore include control variables.6 We control for household and
individual characteristics to account for possible deviations from a common time
trend across branches. As we do not observe (time-varying) branch-specific shocks,
we include household and client characteristics that inter alia determine how well an
individual is able to cope with these shocks. In addition, including household and
client characteristics will potentially increase the precision of the estimates.
6We control, among others, for client age, household income, household size, year of start of
main activity, land ownership, and year of first loan with the microfinance institution providing the
training.
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4.4.2 Impact on financial attitudes
Financial attitude reflects a client’s opinions and judgements about financial is-
sues and the use of financial services. We expect the training to instill financial
attitudes that support sound financial behavior.7
In Table 4.2 we evaluate the effect of the training on up to 21 outcomes. We divide
financial attitude into four categories: budgeting, saving, borrowing, and insurance.
The first three topics are at the core of financial literacy training. Clients were asked
to which extend they agreed or disagreed with given statements related to financial
attitude.
Table 4.2: Impact on financial attitudes
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Budgeting
(1) It is not necessary to analyze which expenses are most important for the family because, anyway,
there is not enough money to pay for everything.
Coefficient -.037 -.041 .037 .016 -.063 -.038 -.027 -.056
Standard error .032 .033 .1 .09 .037 .038 .038 .045
p-value .25 .21 .71 .86 .08 .31 .47 .22
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .297 .293 .514 .508
(2) When your income is low, it is not necessary to keep detailed track of your monthly income
and expenses.
Coefficient -.15 -.16 -.033 -.044 .048 .042 .045 .019
Standard error .034 .035 .72 .6 .034 .035 .037 .045
p-value 0 0 .72 .6 .15 .23 .22 .67
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .471 .415 .606 .555
(3) There is no need to worry in advance and budget for emergencies.
Coefficient -.158 -.162 .101 .098 -.055 -.027 .096 .098
Standard error .03 .03 .094 .09 .024 .025 .034 .041
p-value 0 0 .29 .28 .02 .28 .005 .02
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .319 .345 .132 .213
(4) I try to plan my household budget for a period longer than a year.
Coefficient .177 .171 .127 .123 -.026 -.043 -.017 .098
Standard error .031 .032 .074 .072 .018 .018 .037 .045
p-value 0 0 .09 .09 .15 .02 .65 .03
Continued on next page...
7Results on financial behavior are presented in Section 4.4.3.
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... table 4.2 continued
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .689 .64 .94 .651
Saving
(5) It is worth saving even if your income is low.
Coefficient .099 .094 -.105 -.085 -.026 -.033 -.049 -.03
Standard error .019 .019 .051 .046 .011 .011 .022 .027
p-value 0 0 .05 .07 .02 .004 .03 .26
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .882 .903 .983 .939
(6) I try to save these days, even if these are just small amounts.
Coefficient .109 .1 -.08 -.08 .004 .004 .039 .062
Standard error .019 .019 .042 .039 .01 .01 .022 .028
p-value 0 0 .06 .04 .68 .73 .07 .03
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .88 .872 .978 .949
(7) It is impossible to save because there are always expenses coming up that force you to use
your savings.
Coefficient -.111 -.128 .037 .027 -.083 -.087 .103 .019
Standard error .033 .034 .111 .105 .036 .037 .037 .044
p-value .001 0 .74 .8 .02 .02 .005 .67
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .437 .387 .674 .566
(8) It does not make sense to save since you do not know what tomorrow will bring.
Coefficient -.171 -.156 .041 .034 -.02 -.013 .092 .092
Standard error .027 .028 .091 .083 .019 .02 .033 .039
p-value 0 0 .65 .68 .29 .51 .005 .02
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .313 .284 .075 .219
(9) Even small savings can improve your stability and security in the future.
Coefficient .054 .041 -.15 -.14 .014 .011 .058 .068
Standard error .019 .019 .044 .039 .007 .007 .019 .025
p-value .004 .03 .001 .001 .06 .11 .002 .006
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .882 .92 .983 .967
(10) When things are going well, I try to put money aside to see me through difficult times.
Coefficient .023 .021 .016 .01 -.026 -.033 .033 .01
Standard error .013 .013 .045 .044 .011 .012 .018 .021
p-value .07 .11 .72 .81 .02 .00403 .07 .66
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .958 .947 .977 .955
(11) I cannot keep an emergency reserve because my income is so low that there is never any
money left.
Coefficient -.17 -.176 -.018 -.02 .037 .06 .061 -.014
Standard error .033 .034 .087 .084 .036 .036 .037 .045
p-value 0 0 .84 .81 .31 .1 .1 .75
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .453 .423 .612 .566
(12) I am able to put aside enough money for emergency expenses to make their impact less
severe.
Continued on next page...
91
... table 4.2 continued
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Coefficient .22 .229 -.006 -.01 -.046 -.054 -.009 .033
Standard error .029 .03 .045 .042 .016 .016 .026 .033
p-value 0 0 .89 .82 .003 .00091 .72 .32
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .659 .834 .978 .922
Borrowing
(13) It is shameful to borrow money.
Coefficient .037 .021 -.079 -.081 .037 -.019
Standard error .088 .081 .036 .037 .032 .04
p-value .67 .8 .03 .03 .25 .63
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .291 .415 .799
(14) We can achieve our goals more quickly with borrowed money.
Coefficient .09 .075 .039 .046 -.079 -.086 -.079 -.108
Standard error .023 .024 .081 .08 .021 .023 .02 .025
p-value 0 .002 .63 .57 .00021 .00014 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .846 .785 .112 .971
(15) We consider a loan only as a last resort.
Coefficient -.001 -.009 .292 .298 -.002 .018 -.106 -.115
Standard error .031 .032 .065 .065 .028 .029 .024 .028
p-value .99 .77 0 0 .95 .53 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .569 .697 .816 .94
(16) It is easy to fall into a debt trap.
Coefficient .074 .073 -.098 -.086
Standard error .091 .092 .036 .037
p-value .42 .43 .00651 .02
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .446 .406
(17) It is easy to service multiple loans.
Coefficient .047 .029
Standard error .022 .022
p-value .04 .2
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .125
Insurance
(18) We don’t need insurance because nothing bad can happen to my family or assets.
Coefficient -.148 -.145 -.108 -.11
Standard error .028 .029 .037 .043
p-value 0 0 .004 .01
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .293 .59
(19) Insurance is expensive.
Coefficient -.173 -.151 -.086 -.082
Standard error .034 .035 .035 .043
p-value 0 0 .01 .05
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .547 .814
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.2 continued
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(20) There is no need for insurance we can solve our problems by our own.
Coefficient -.07 -.082 -.164 -.162
Standard error .034 .035 .037 .044
p-value .04 .02 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .489 .644
(21) Insurance companies are reliable.
Coefficient .022 .042 -.172 .007
Standard error .032 .033 .035 .043
p-value .49 .2 0 .87
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .685 .814
Notes: Clients were asked to which extend they agreed/disagreed with given statements related
to financial attitude. Possible answers were: (1) ‘I definitely agree’, (2) ‘I rather agree’, (3) ‘I
rather disagree’ or (4) ‘I definitely disagree’. The coefficient gives the change in the share of clients
agreeing (defined as ‘I definitely agree’ or ‘I rather agree’) as opposed to disagreeing (defined as ‘I
rather disagree’ or ‘I definitely disagree’).
Specification (1) is without controls, while specification (2) includes controls.
Attitudes related to budgeting
Investigating financial education with an emphasis on microinsurance imple-
mented in Vietnam (see Section 4.2.2), the main message from column 1 in Table
4.2 is that the marginal effect of training on most budgeting-related variables, in
regressions as specified in equation (4.1), is statistically significant and as intended.
Clients who received the training are more likely to disagree that it is not necessary
to keep detailed track of monthly income and expenses. They are also more likely to
disagree that there is no need to worry in advance and budget for emergencies, and
more likely to report that they plan their household budget for a period longer than
a year. However, we find no effect on whether clients find it necessary to analyze
which expenses are most important for the family. Column 2 in Table 4.2 presents
estimates of the treatment effect including control variables. The key result is that
the estimates are robust to including controls.
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Investigating financial education with an emphasis on generating business ideas
and starting a business in the Philippines (see Section 4.2.3), among the four out-
comes the only statistically significant treatment effect (at the 10% level of statistical
significance) is found on whether clients plan their household budget for more than a
year (column 3 in Table 4.2), which is as intended. This effect is robust to including
controls (see column 4). One explanation for the lack of effects is that the focus
of this training was on entrepreneurship rather than on budgeting of (household)
expenses.
Investigating financial education delivered through interaction with credit officers
in Cambodia (see Section 4.2.4), we find an unintended treatment effect on whether
clients feel that there is no need to worry in advance and budget for emergencies
(column 5 in Table 4.2). We also find an unintended effect on whether clients find
it necessary to analyze which expenses are most important for the family. However,
both effects are not robust to including controls (see column 6). Furthermore, we
find an unintended effect with respect to household budget planning for more than
a year, but only when including controls. According to an unpublished ILO report
on the topics that credit officers discussed with their clients, budgeting-related issues
came out on last place. Only about 50% of credit officers had discussed this topic
with their clients. Clients were more exposed to discussions on savings (80%) and the
use of loans (60%). It should be noted, however, that this survey was conducted at
an early stage of the implementation of client training. Nevertheless, it may suggest
that rather low priority was given to budgeting-related issues, which may explain the
lack of a training effect.
Investigating financial education delivered through a two-day training course in
Cambodia (see Section 4.2.5), we find a statistically significant treatment effect on
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whether clients feel no need to worry in advance and budget for emergencies. This
effect is unintended as training participants are more likely to agree that there is
no need to worry in advance and budget for emergencies. Furthermore, we find an
intended effect with respect to household budget planning for more than a year, but
only when including controls. We detect no impact on the remaining two outcomes.
Attitudes related to saving
In Table 4.2, the first four savings-related attitudes refer to savings in general,
while the remaining four outcomes refer to savings for emergencies.
In Vietnam, all eight savings-related attitudes move in the intended direction.
Except for the effect on the statement ‘I try to put money aside to see me through
difficult times when things are going well’, all results are robust to including covari-
ates. Some of the effects are substantial, e.g. treated clients are 17 percentage points
(s.e. = 3.3%) less likely to indicate that they cannot keep an emergency reserve be-
cause their income is so low that there is never any money left, compared to 45.3%
of clients in the treatment group who indicated such attitude at baseline.
In the Philippines, the training is found to have unintended impact on three
outcome variables. Treated clients are less likely to agree that it is worth saving even
if your income is low, that they try to save these days, even if these are just small
amounts, and that even small savings can improve their stability and security in the
future. These results are robust to including covariates (see column 4). We do not
detect a treatment effect on the remaining five outcome variables. Again, it should
be noted that in the Philippines the training focussed on generating and starting a
business, which may at least partially serve as an explanation as to why we do not
find impact on savings-related attitudes as intended. Clients who apply for business
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loans are supposed to invest the loan into their businesses which is why we may find
negative effects on savings-related attitudes.
In Cambodia 1, where financial education was delivered through interaction with
credit officers, we find an effect as intended on the following two outcomes (see column
5 in Table 4.2): Clients are less likely to agree that it is impossible to save because
there are always expenses coming up that force you to use your savings, and they are
more likely to agree that even small savings can improve their stability and security
in the future. However, we also find an effect on the following three outcomes, which
is unintended: Clients are less likely to agree that it is worth saving even if income
is low, and that when things are going well, they try to put money aside to see them
through difficult times; they are more likely to be unable to put aside enough money
for emergency expenses to make their impact less severe. Except for the result on
the attitude that even small savings can improve their stability and security in the
future, all results are robust to including covariates (column 6). We do not find an
effect on the remaining three outcomes. In sum, the training is found to generate
rather mixed effects on savings-related attitudes.
For the other financial training in Cambodia, where financial education was de-
livered through a two-day training course, we find the following three intended effects
(see column 7 in Table 4.2): Treated clients are more likely to agree that they try
to save these days, even if these are just small amounts, that even small savings can
improve their stability and security in the future, and that when things are going
well, they try to put money aside to see them through difficult times. However, the
last effect is not robust to including covariates. We also find the following three
unintended effects. First, treated clients are less likely to indicate that it is worth
saving even if their income is low. Second, they are more likely to indicate that it is
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impossible to save because there are always expenses coming up that force them to
use their savings. Third, they are more likely to agree that it does not make sense
to save since you do not know what tomorrow will bring. However, only the last
unintended effect is robust to including covariates.
Attitudes related to borrowing
Investigating the effect of the training on attitudes related to borrowing, we use
up to five outcome variables. Two of them, whether clients agree with the statements
‘We can achieve our goals more quickly with borrowed money’ and ‘We consider a
loan only as a last resort’ were asked to all clients.
The two outcome variables ‘It is shameful to borrow money’ and ‘We can achieve
our goals more quickly with borrowed money’ probe a client’s attitude towards bor-
rowing. We consider believing that it is shameful to borrow, as well as not realizing
that sometimes it is useful to borrow money to achieve a (business) goal more quickly,
to be harmful in terms of missing out profitable business opportunities. The remain-
ing three outcome variables, ‘We consider a loan only as a last resort’, ‘It is easy
to fall into a debt trap’ and ‘It is easy to service multiple loans’, probe a client’s
awareness about not becoming over-indebted.
In Vietnam, training participants are more likely to indicate that they can achieve
their goals more quickly with borrowed money, which is intended as explained above.
On the remaining borrowing-related outcome, whether clients consider a loan only as
a last resort, we detect no impact. These results are robust to including covariates.
In the Philippines, we find a positive treatment effect on whether clients consider
a loan only as a last resort. Thus, the training is found to improve an attitude that is
considered to be important for not becoming over-indebted. We detect no impact on
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the remaining outcomes – whether it is shameful to borrow money, whether clients
can achieve their goals more quickly with borrowed money or whether it is easy to
fall into a debt trap.
In Cambodia 1, we find a training effect on four outcomes; in three instances the
effect is unintended. First, training participants are less likely to consider borrowing
to be shameful, which is intended. Second, treated clients are less likely to agree
that goals can be achieved more quickly with borrowed money, which is unintended.
They may not find it easier to achieve their goals more quickly with borrowed money
because available loans might be too small8 or clients lack business opportunities,
something that the training may have made them realize. Third, training partici-
pants are less likely to consider that it is easy to fall into a debt trap. Fourth, treated
clients are more likely to agree that it is easy to service multiple loans. However, the
latter effect is not robust to including covariates. Considering the last two effects, it
appears that the training made clients more confident to handle debt. We find no
effect on whether clients consider a loan only as a last resort.
For the other financial training intervention in Cambodia, we find the following:
Treated clients are less likely to agree that goals can be achieved more quickly with
borrowed money, which is unintended. Furthermore, treatment group clients are less
likely to consider a loan only as a last resort, which is also unintended, potentially
putting clients at risk of becoming over-indebted. We do not detect impact on
whether clients think that it is shameful to borrow money.
8According to the MFI’s Annual Report 2010, 59% of outstanding loans are less than US$ 151
and 35% are between US$ 151 and 300.
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Attitudes related to insurance
Two microfinance institutions devoted part of the training to insurance.9 The
first three indicators address the demand for insurance; clients were asked whether
they agree with the statement ‘We don’t need insurance because nothing bad can
happen to my family or assets’, whether they agree that ‘insurance is expensive’, and
whether they agree with ‘There is no need for insurance, we can solve our problems
by our own’. The fourth outcome relates to a potential lack of trust in insurance
companies (see Table 4.2).
In Vietnam and Cambodia, treated clients are less likely to state that they do not
need insurance because nothing bad can happen to their family or assets. They are
also less likely to believe that they can solve their problems on their own, which is
consistent with the former. Furthermore, fewer treated clients agree that insurance
is expensive. From these three results we may conclude that the training increases
demand for insurance.
In Cambodia, treated clients are less likely to agree that insurance companies are
reliable. However, this result is not robust to including covariates. In Vietnam, we
do not find impact on trust in insurance companies.
Across the four financial training interventions, financial training has not been
overwhelmingly successful in generating intended effects on financial attitudes. On
attitudes related to budgeting, saving and borrowing we find intended as well as
unintended impact. On insurance-related attitudes, we find financial education to
have impact as intended. Generally, we find financial education to perform best in
Vietnam where the training was delivered through a two half-day training course
with the key messages being reiterated during regular bank meetings.
9Data on insurance-related attitudes were only collected for these two training interventions.
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4.4.3 Impact on financial behavior
We expect that financially informed clients are able to better assess risks (health
shocks, natural disasters, business failure, and over-indebtedness) and take effective
steps to eliminate or reduce them. For example, we expect that clients use financial
planning and budgeting to make decisions about business and household spending,
that they consider their needs and their capacity to repay and the risk of default
before taking a loan, that they spend wisely to be able to save for emergencies and
to build assets, and that clients use a mix of financial services including insurance to
cover against risks.10
In Table 4.3, we evaluate the effect of the training on up to 9 outcomes. We divide
financial behavior into four categories: planning of expenses, budgeting, saving, and
spending.
Table 4.3: Impact on financial behavior
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Planning expenses
(1) Plan household expenses
Coefficient .222 .223 .015 .016 -.082 -.085 .106 .163
Standard error .031 .032 .021 .021 .023 .023 .027 .034
p-value 0 0 .46 .44 0 0 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .703 .949 .09 .063
(2) Plan business expenses
Coefficient .108 .089 -.008 -.008 0 .061
Standard error .034 .035 .016 .016 .033 .041
p-value .001 .01 .64 .63 .99 .14
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .699 .962 .178
Budgeting
(3) We run out of money before making income.
Coefficient -.131 -.123 .115 .101 -.046 -.011 .23 .153
Standard error .034 .035 .071 .064 .033 .032 .035 .043
Continued on next page...
10Results on asset building, including savings and use of insurance, are presented in Section 4.4.4.
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... table 4.3 continued
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p-value 0 0 .11 .12 .16 .73 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .405 .242 .289 .303
(4) We do not have enough money left to meet fixed monthly payments.
Coefficient .034 .039 .047 .029 -.015 .007 .267 .152
Standard error .031 .032 .075 .064 .033 .033 .035 .043
p-value .28 .22 .53 .66 .64 .84 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .291 .181 .349 .26
(5) Major seasonal expenses (e.g. celebrations) have a negative impact on our living standard
in the months when they occur because we do not budget for them in advance.
Coefficient .144 .133 .09 .078 -.059 -.032 .196 .161
Standard error .03 .03 .07 .065 .032 .032 .036 .044
p-value 0 0 .2 .23 .06 .32 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .192 .24 .284 .315
(6) We set aside money for emergencies when planning our budget.
Coefficient .157 .169 -.028 -.033 -.04 -.081 .063 .089
Standard error .033 .034 .072 .073 .035 .036 .038 .045
p-value 0 0 .7 .65 .26 .02 .1 .05
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .604 .68 .412 .508
(7) At the end of the month, we have some money left that can be put into savings or spent on
extra purchases.
Coefficient -.116 -.116 .128 .118 .008 -.044 .092 .157
Standard error .034 .035 .076 .077 .033 .033 .038 .044
p-value .001 .001 .1 .13 .81 .19 .01 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .653 .558 .267 .483
Spending
(8) We give in to the temptation and buy things which we later regret.
Coefficient -.068 -.051 .135 .125 -.021 -.021 .129 .083
Standard error .025 .025 .06 .055 .02 .021 .024 .03
p-value .006 .04 .03 .03 .3 .3 0 .005
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .188 .183 .11 .071
(9) When we run out of money, we borrow or buy on credit and pay our debts a month later.
Coefficient -.074 -.083 .023 .025 -.036 -.009 .194 .136
Standard error .033 .034 .073 .066 .031 .031 .03 .036
p-value .02 .01 .76 .71 .24 .78 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .335 .221 .257 .154
Notes: Clients were asked to which extend they agreed/disagreed with given statements related
to financial attitude. Possible answers were: (1) ‘I definitely agree’, (2) ‘I rather agree’, (3) ‘I
rather disagree’ or (4) ‘I definitely disagree’. The coefficient gives the change in the share of clients
agreeing (defined as ‘I definitely agree’ or ‘I rather agree’) as opposed to disagreeing (defined as ‘I
rather disagree’ or ‘I definitely disagree’).
Specification (1) is without controls, while specification (2) includes controls.
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Planning expenses
In Vietnam, we find the training to have an effect on whether households plan
their expenses. This effect is substantial. While 70.3% of clients in the treatment
group have already been planning household expenses at baseline, we find them to
be 22.2 percentage points (s.e.= 3.1%) more likely to plan their household expenses
after the introduction of the training. We also find a positive effect on the planning
of business expenses. In the Philippines, we do not find an effect on the planning
of household or business expenses. In Cambodia 1, treated clients are less likely to
plan their household expenses, which is puzzling. In Cambodia 2, while we find the
training to have a positive effect on the planning of household expenses, we detect
no impact on the planning of business expenses.
Budgeting
In Vietnam, treated clients are less likely to report that they run out of money
before making income. Furthermore, they are more likely to report that they set
money aside when planning the budget. We also find two unintended effects. First,
training participants are more likely to indicate that major seasonal expenses have
a negative impact on their living standard because they do not budget for them
in advance. Second, they are less likely to indicate that at the end of the month,
they have some money left that can be put into savings or spent on extra purchases.
However, as treated clients are more likely to set money aside when planning the
budget, it follows that, at the end of the month, there should be less (unplanned)
money left. We find no effect on whether clients have enough money left to meet
fixed monthly expenses.
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In the Philippines, we do not find an effect on any of the five outcome variables.
As already mentioned, the lack of effect on budgeting practices may be explained
by the training having a focus on generating and starting a business, as opposed to
budgeting. These results are consistent with what we found on financial attitude
(Table 4.2), as we may think that informed financial attitudes should translate into
sound financial behavior.
In Cambodia 1, we find an effect, which is as intended, on whether major seasonal
expenses have a negative impact on the living standard because clients do not budget
for them in advance. However, this result is not robust to including covariates. We
also find an unintended effect on whether clients set aside money for emergencies
when planning their budget, but only when including covariates. We do not detect
impact on the remaining outcomes.
In Cambodia 2, we find the training to have impact as intended on two outcomes.
First, treated clients are more likely to indicate that at the end of the month, they
have some money left that can be put into savings or spent on extra purchases.
Second, they are more likely to report that they set aside money for emergencies when
planning their budget. On the other hand, the training is found to have unintended
impact on the following three outcomes. First, training participants are more likely
to report to run out of money before making income. Second, they are more likely to
indicate that they do not have enough money left to meet fixed monthly payments.
Third, they are more likely to indicate that major seasonal expenses have a negative
impact on their living standard because they do not budget for them in advance.
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Spending
In Vietnam, there is evidence for more prudent spending as for training partic-
ipants the following indicators move in the expected direction: ‘We give in to the
temptation and buy things which we later regret’ and ‘When we run out of money,
we borrow or buy on credit and pay debts later’. In the Philippines and Cambo-
dia 2, however, treated clients are more likely to indicate that they give in to the
temptation and buy things which they later regret. In Cambodia 2, participants
are also more likely to indicate that when they run out of money, they borrow or
buy on credit. One explanation for these results is that the training may have made
clients more aware of such behavior. Thus, they are more likely to report that such
behavior has been occurring. We do not detect impact on spending-related behavior
in Cambodia 1. All results are robust to including covariates.
In sum, while we find some evidence for the training to improve financial behavior,
we also find a worsening in several financial behavior indicators. These results could
be explained by the findings in the previous section on financial attitudes, as we
expect informed financial attitudes to translate into sound financial behavior.
4.4.4 Impact on asset building
In Table 4.4, we evaluate the effect of the training on asset building, dividing
assets into four categories: insurance, profit, physical assets, and savings. We expect
that financially informed clients will be in a better position to build and maintain
their financial assets (savings and insurance) as well as physical assets (land, property
and equipment).
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Table 4.4: Impact on assets
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Insurance
(1) Life insurance
Coefficient .026 .021
Standard error .016 .017
p-value .11 .21
TG mean at t = 0 .05
(2) Mandatory social insurance
Coefficient .013 .012
Standard error .01 .01
p-value .16 .21
TG mean at t = 0 .014
(3) Voluntary social insurance
Coefficient -.007 -.009
Standard error .008 .008
p-value .4 .28
TG mean at t = 0 .016
(4) Motorbike liability insurance
Coefficient .053 .048
Standard error .027 .028
p-value .05 .08
TG mean at t = 0 .192
(5) Unemployment insurance
Coefficient .005 .004
Standard error .004 .004
p-value .31 .35
TG mean at t = 0 .004
(6) Health insurance
Coefficient .055 .028
Standard error .03 .03
p-value .07 .35
TG mean at t = 0 .327
(7) Household property insurance
Coefficient -.001 -.001
Standard error .002 .002
p-value .47 .49
TG mean at t = 0 .002
(8) Business assets insurance
Coefficient -.002 -.003
Standard error .003 .003
p-value .53 .35
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.4 continued
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
TG mean at t = 0 .002
(9) Car insurance
Coefficient -.008 -.007
Standard error .006 .006
p-value .23 .26
TG mean at t = 0 .014
(10) Household uses insurance
Coefficient .093 .108
Standard error .025 .026
p-value .00023 .00003
TG mean at t = 0 .043
Profit
(11) Profit in main activity
Coefficient 2718.2 2173.4
Standard error 1299.8 1024
p-value .04 .04
TG mean at t = 0 2987.1
Physical assets
(12)New land/real estate bought
Coefficient .03 .03
Standard error .022 .022
p-value .17 .17
TG mean at t = 0 NA
(13) Household bought land
Coefficient -.019 -.023
Standard error .019 .019
p-value .32 .23
TG mean at t = 0 .085
(14) New motorized vehicle bought
Coefficient .036 .033
Standard error .012 .011
p-value .003 .005
TG mean at t = 0 NA
(15) Household bought other assets
Coefficient .004 -.035
Standard error .036 .037
p-value .91 .34
TG mean at t = 0 .432
Savings
(16) Household saves
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.4 continued
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Coefficient -.049 -.118 .007 .105
Standard error .033 .032 .035 .04
p-value .14 .00025 .85 .01
TG mean at t = 0 .718 .717
(17) Savings increased
Coefficient -.064 -.132
Standard error .032 .032
p-value .05 .00004
TG mean at t = 0 .277
(18) Household savings amount
Coefficient -1920158.2 461133.91
p-value .009 .65
Standard error 736854.7 1024261.5
TG mean at t = 0 3879742.5
Notes: Specification (1) is without controls, while specification (2) includes controls.
TG: Treatment group.
Insurance
In Vietnam, as part of the training was on insurance, we have rich information
on insurance outcomes. Insurance is important for asset building as it can protect
assets in the event of a shock. We find the training to have a positive effect on
motorbike liability insurance. Although we cannot say how much each of the topics
of the financial literacy training contributed to this finding, this effect might actually
be driven by the topic ‘The civil responsibility of motor vehicle owners’ that was part
of the training. We also find a positive effect on health insurance, which is not robust
to including covariates. We do not find an effect on life insurance, mandatory social
insurance, voluntary social insurance, unemployment insurance, household property
insurance, business assets insurance or car insurance.
In Cambodia 1, we find a positive treatment effect on the use of insurance; how-
ever, we do not know which type of insurance clients use.
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Profit
We include profit in the asset building category as profits can be reinvested into
enterprise assets. In the Philippines, we find the training to have a positive effect
on the profit in the main activity. As the training in the Philippines had a focus
on entrepreneurship, this result provides some evidence that knowledge acquired
through the training translated into larger profits.11
Physical assets
In the Philippines, we find that treatment group clients are 4 percentage points
(s.e.= 1.2%) more likely to buy a motorized vehicle. On the purchase of real estate
or land, we do not detect impact. Neither do we detect impact on land or other
assets in Cambodia 1.
Savings
In Cambodia 1, the training is found to have a negative effect on household
savings, as measured by both the incidence of saving and by a binary variable whether
the savings amount has increased. As mentioned above, we also found that treated
clients are more likely to use insurance. One explanation for this result is that clients
might be substituting between insurance and savings.
In Cambodia 2, we find the training to have a positive effect on the incidence
of saving when including covariates. On the savings amount, the point estimate is
unstable as it changes sign and becomes statistically insignificant when including
covariates.
11Unfortunately, we are unable to use this outcome for exploring the other training interventions
in Vietnam and Cambodia, since the questionnaires did not include questions on profit.
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In sum, we find some evidence for the training to positively affect the building
of assets as we find positive impact on the use of insurance, the size of profits and
the incidence of savings. There is also weak evidence that treatment group clients
substitute between savings and insurance.
4.4.5 Impact on over-indebtedness/multiple borrowing
In Table 4.5, we evaluate the effect of the training on measures of over-indebt-
edness, dividing over-indebtedness into two categories: borrowing and repayment
difficulties. We expect that financially informed clients will be able to minimize
the number of active loans and corresponding amounts owed to formal and informal
financial service providers. As a consequence, they should have fewer repayment
difficulties, and reduce late loan repayment and default.
Table 4.5: Impact on over-indebtedness
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Borrowing
(1) Borrowed from other informal sources
Coefficient .043 .018 .038 .04 .207 .218
Standard error .022 .022 .036 .036 .062 .072
p-value .05 .41 .29 .27 .001 .003
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .04 .129 .632
(2) Borrowed from other formal sources (other than the MFI that provided the training)
Coefficient .037 .033 -.016 -.015 -.19 -.247
Standard error .033 .034 .018 .018 .061 .072
p-value .27 .33 .39 .41 .002 .001
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .281 .025 .342
(3) Number of different sources
Coefficient .005 -.004
Standard error .044 .044
p-value .91 .93
Treatment group mean at t = 0 1.36
(4) Amount owed to other loan providers
Coefficient 712 573 -121422 -223844
Continued on next page...
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Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Standard error 350 427 125880 131432
p-value .05 .19 .33 .09
Treatment group mean at t = 0 546 418940
Repayment difficulties
(6) Repayment difficulties during the last year
Coefficient .014 .011 .022 .019 -.04 -.015 .112 .072
Standard error .009 .009 .029 .029 .028 .028 .025 .029
p-value .13 .21 .45 .53 .15 .58 0 .01
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .014 .065 .155 .114
(7) Expect repayment difficulties
Coefficient .014 .011 -.054 -.06 .066 .052
Standard error .01 .011 .037 .036 .02 .025
p-value .17 .33 .14 .1 .001 .04
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .012 .084 .078
(8) Took out loan to repay another loan
Coefficient -.123 -.15 -.098 -.097 -.008 -.009 .096 .096
Standard error .026 .026 .068 .065 .016 .017 .018 .023
p-value 0 0 .015 .14 .61 .6 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .154 .196 .053 .033
(9) Late repayment (as measured by the MFI’s management information system)
Coefficient 0 .002 -.056 -.057
Standard error .003 .004 .024 .025
p-value .89 .67 .02 .03
Treatment group mean at t = 0 0 .072
(10) Late repayment ever experienced (self-reported)
Coefficient -.209 -.179
Standard error .019 .019
p-value .005 .02
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .415
(11) Late repayment (self-reported)
Coefficient -.034 -.031
Standard error .019 .019
p-value .08 .1
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .079
(12) Late repayment ≤ 30 days
Coefficient -.018 -.022
Standard error .013 .014
p-value .17 .1
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .037
(13) Late repayment 30-60 days
Coefficient 0 -.002
Continued on next page...
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Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Standard error .007 .007
p-value .98 .81
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .009
(14) Late repayment 61-90 days
Coefficient .008 .011
Standard error .005 .006
p-value .14 .09
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .004
(15) Late repayment > 90 days
Coefficient -.028 -.023
Standard error .012 .012
p-value .02 .04
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .035
Notes: Specification (1) is without controls, while specification (2) includes controls.
Borrowing
In Vietnam, we find a positive treatment effect on the incidence of borrowing from
other informal sources. However, this effect becomes statistically insignificant when
including covariates. We find no impact on borrowing from other formal sources.
In the Philippines, while we find no effect on the incidence of borrowing from
another source (formal or informal), we do find a treatment effect on the amount
borrowed from a formal or informal source. Treated clients appear to have increased
the amount of money owed to formal or informal financial service providers. However,
this effect becomes statistically insignificant when including covariates.
In Cambodia 1, we are not able to explore the effect on the incidence of bor-
rowing from other formal or informal sources due to lack of data. Instead, we use
a variable that measures the number of different loan sources, on which we find no
treatment effect. We find a negative treatment effect on the amount owed to other
loan providers, but only when we include covariates.
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In Cambodia 2, treated clients are more likely to borrow from other informal
sources. At the same time, they are less likely to borrow from other formal sources.
Thus, there is weak evidence that the training resulted in clients substituting between
informal and formal borrowing.
Repayment difficulties
In Vietnam, we do not detect impact on (self-reported) repayment difficulties dur-
ing the last year; neither do we find an effect on client expectations about repayment
difficulties within the next 6 months. However, we do find impact on the incidence of
borrowing to repay another loan; we find target group clients to be less likely to have
taken a loan to repay another loan. This effect is substantial. Treated clients are
less likely to borrow to repay another loan by 12.3 percentage points (s.e.= 2.6%).
We do not find impact on late repayment (as measured by the MFI’s management
information system). It should be noted, however, that late loan repayment in the
target group was already 0 percent before the introduction of the training.
In the Philippines, we find no effect on repayment difficulties during the last year
nor on client expectations about repayment difficulties within the next 6 months.
We do find the training to reduce the incidence of borrowing to repay another loan.
However, this effect is not robust to including covariates. We also find that training
participants are less likely to repay late as measured by the MFI’s management
information system. The estimated magnitude of this effect is -5.6 percentage points
(s.e.= 2.4%).
In Cambodia 1, we find no effect on repayment difficulties during the last year
or whether clients borrowed to repay. Data are available on overall late repayment,
repayment 30 days late, between 30 and 60 days late and more than 90 days late,
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all of which are self-reported. We find an effect on overall late repayment and on
repayment more than 90 days late. Training is estimated to lead to a reduction in
repayment more than 90 days late by 2.8 percentage points (s.e.= 1.2%).
In Cambodia 2, all three outcome variables move in an unintended direction.
Target group clients are more likely to report repayment difficulties during the last
year and they are also more likely to expect repayment difficulties. They are also
more like to have taken out a loan to repay another loan. On the other hand, we find
treatment group clients to have an improved repayment performance as measured
by whether they have ever experienced late repayment. Thus, we may cautiously
interpret this result that improved loan repayment may come at the cost of clients
taking out (new) loans. Earlier, in Section 4.4.5, we saw that treated clients were
more likely to borrow from other informal sources, suggesting that clients take out
new informal loans.
In sum, we find the training to improve loan repayment performance despite
increased borrowing. We also find weak evidence that improved loan repayment may
come at the cost of clients taking out loans to make these repayments. If this were
proven to be true, it would underline the importance of raising clients’ awareness on
fulfilling current loan obligations without incurring additional obligations with other
loan providers.
4.4.6 Impact on vulnerability
In Table 4.6 we evaluate the effect of the training on measures of vulnerability,
dividing vulnerability into two categories: ability to cover (unforeseen) expenses
and coping mechanisms. We expect that financially informed clients are in a better
position to meet their monthly expenses no matter whether they are planned or
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unplanned. We also expect that clients’ need to sell assets in times of hardship will
be reduced.
Table 4.6: Impact on vulnerability
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Ability to cover expenses
(1) Whether income covers expenses
Coefficient .033 .04 -.019 -.006 -.028 -.105 -.222 -.17
Standard error .019 .019 .016 .017 .03 .029 .027 .033
p-value .08 .04 .26 .74 .35 .00026 0 0
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .926 .975 .792 .919
(2) Could cover unforeseen household expenses
Coefficient .081 .084 -.457 -.409 .086 .135
Standard error .087 .087 .125 .113 .043 .051
p-value .35 .33 .001 .001 .05 .009
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .659 .675 .61
(3) Could cover unforeseen business expenses
Coefficient -.144 -.128 -.007 .017 -.351 -.312
Standard error .208 .21 .299 .325 .081 .097
p-value .49 .54 .98 .96 0 .001
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .667 .194 .688
(4) Could cover unforeseen expenses
Coefficient -.011 -.066
Standard error .045 .044
p-value .8 .13
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .43
Coping mechanisms
(5) Used savings to cover unforeseen expenses
Coefficient -.033 -.031 .11 .022 -.176 -.043
Standard error .049 .049 .134 .106 .036 .042
p-value .5 .53 .42 .83 0 .3
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .96 .508 .772
(6) Sold assets to cover unforeseen expenses
Coefficient -.1 -.099 -.025 -.022 -.026 .034
Standard error .048 .048 .04 .043 .025 .033
p-value .04 .04 .53 .61 .3 .29
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .104 .016 .125
(7) Used microinsurance to cover unforeseen expenses
Coefficient .025 .025 .053 .06 .004 0
Standard error .035 .035 .036 .037 .005 .006
p-value .48 .48 .15 .11 .38 1
Continued on next page...
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... table 4.6 continued
Vietnam Philippines Cambodia 1 Cambodia 2
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .043 0 .004
(8) Sacrificed household expenditures to cover unforeseen expenses
Coefficient .09 .085 .017 .018 -.062 -.067
Standard error .068 .068 .05 .049 .022 .028
p-value .19 .21 .73 .72 .006 .01
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .191 .024 .121
(9) Sold assets to cover asset shock
Coefficient -.211 -.226
Standard error .135 .142
p-value .12 .11
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .333
(10) Used savings to cover asset shock
Coefficient -.22 -.198
Standard error .173 .182
p-value .21 .28
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .458
(11) Sold assets to cover health shock
Coefficient .036 .033
Standard error .067 .069
p-value .59 .64
Treatment group mean at t = 0 .222
(12) Used savings to cover health shock
Coefficient -.166 -.199
Standard error .071 .073
p-value .02 .0065
Treatment group mean at t = 0 75
Notes: Specification (1) is without controls, while specification (2) includes controls.
Ability to cover expenses
In Vietnam, we find a positive training effect on whether clients’ household income
covered all household expenses in the last 12 months, the ability of which is found
to increase by 3.3 percentage points (s.e.= 1.9%). We do not detect impact on
unforeseen expenses, whether these are household or business expenses.
In the Philippines, we find that target group clients are less likely to be able
to cover their unforeseen business expenses. We do not find impact on whether a
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client’s income covered all household expenses or whether clients could cover their
unforeseen business expenses.
In Cambodia 1, we find the training to have a negative impact on the ability
to cover household expenses through income, but only when including covariates.
We also detect a negative effect on whether clients could cover unforeseen expenses.
However, this effect is not robust to including covariates.
In Cambodia 2, we find the training to improve the ability to cover unforeseen
household expenses. However, target group clients are less likely able to cover house-
hold expenses through income. In addition, target group clients are less likely to be
able to cover unforeseen business expenses.
Coping mechanisms
In Vietnam, we find that treated clients are 10 percentage points (s.e.= 4.9%)
less likely to sell their assets to cover unforeseen expenses. We do not find impact
on whether clients used savings, whether they used microinsurance or whether they
sacrificed household expenses to cover unforeseen expenses.
In the Philippines, we do not find impact on any of the four indicators representing
mechanisms to cope with shocks. However, as treated clients were found to be less
likely able to cover their unforeseen household expenses, in order to cope with a
shock they may have actually increased the amount that they borrow, as we found
in Table 4.5.
In Cambodia 1, we find treated clients to be less likely to use savings to cover
health-related expenses. One explanation for this effect may be a higher use of
insurance among target group clients, as in Table 4.4 we found a positive treatment
effect on the use of insurance. We do not find impact on whether clients sold assets
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to cover asset shocks, used savings to cover asset shocks or sold assets to cover health
shocks.
In Cambodia 2, we find that target group clients are less likely to sacrifice house-
hold expenditures to cover unforeseen expenses. They are also less likely to use
savings to cover unforeseen expenses. However, this last result is not robust to in-
cluding covariates. As clients appear to neither use savings nor sacrifice household
expenditures, they may have actually increased informal borrowing, as we found in
Table 4.5.
In sum, on the ability to cover planned or unforeseen expenses, while we also
find positive impact, sometimes our findings suggest a negative training effect. One
explanation for this result is that treated clients might be better aware as to whether
they generate enough income to cover their regularly occurring expenses and also
about their actual ability to cover unforeseen expenses. We find little evidence that
training participants cope with shocks as per the indicators we explored. However,
this does not necessarily mean that clients use unsustainable coping mechanisms. As
the choice of exploring potential coping mechanisms is limited by the data at hand,
we might be missing important channels through which clients respond to shocks.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper explored the role of four financial training programs implemented in
Vietnam, the Philippines and Cambodia on outcomes related to financial attitude,
risk management, broadly defined as financial behavior including asset building,
over-indebtedness and vulnerability.
Across all four financial training interventions, we found financial education to be
somewhat successful in generating intended effects on financial attitudes. We found
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intended, but also unintended, impact on attitudes related to budgeting, saving
and borrowing, except for insurance-related attitudes, where we found impact as
intended.
While we found some evidence for financial literacy training to improve financial
behavior, we also found a worsening in several financial behavior indicators. These
results could be explained by our findings on financial attitudes, as we expected fi-
nancial attitudes to translate into financial behavior. We found some evidence for
financial education to positively affect the building of assets, including weak evidence
that treatment group clients substitute between savings and insurance. Hence, fi-
nancial education was somewhat successful in generating effects on risk management
as intended.
Moreover, we found financial literacy training to improve loan repayment per-
formance despite increased borrowing. We also found weak evidence that improved
loan repayment may come at the cost of clients taking out loans to make repayments.
Our findings suggest a negative training effect on the ability to cover planned or
unforeseen expenses. One explanation for this result is that treated clients might
be better aware as to whether they are able to cover their planned or unforeseen
expenses. We find little evidence on the use of improved coping mechanisms. This
does not necessarily mean that clients use unsustainable coping mechanisms as we
might be missing other important channels through which clients respond to shocks.
The four financial education interventions differed with respect to content and
as to how the training was delivered. Overall, we found the training impact to be
strongest in Vietnam, where financial education was delivered through a two half-day
training course with the key messages reiterated during regular bank meetings. The
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other financial education programs showed more mixed results. We found that the
financial training which had a focus on business skills increased profits.
Our findings show that financial literacy training can play an important role
in terms of improving attitudes towards financial issues as well as improving risk
management strategies. The recent literature has focussed on business training rather
than financial literacy in developing countries. More research is needed on the mode
of delivery and the content to teach, in particular as to whether a general financial
literacy training or a training with a focus on starting or managing a business can
build the human capital poor households and microentrepreneurs may need in order
to improve their livelihoods.
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Appendix
Table 4.7: Summary statistics of client/household characteristics at baseline –
Vietnam
Variable Names Treatment Control Difference p-value
Sex of client (% female) 100 100 0 .
Client age 42.14 44.92 -2.78 0
Household income VND < 1 million 3.8 13.3 -9.5 0
Household income VND 1-2 million 23.5 29 -5.4 .05
Household income VND 2-5 million 48.7 45.5 3.2 .31
Household income VND > 5 million 23.9 12.3 11.7 0
Household size 4.9 4.5 .4 0
Unforeseen expenses (%) 10 52.1 -42.1 0
Amount owed to others (VND) 4732465 8876453 -4143988 0
Year of first loan with MFI 2003.7 2003.9 -.2 .62
Last MFI loan amount (VND) 9073695 5640974 3432721 0
Year of start main activity 1989.6 1987.2 2.3 0
The p-value stems from a means comparing t-test.
Table 4.8: Summary statistics of client/household characteristics at baseline –
Philippines
Variable Names Treatment Control Difference p-value
Sex of client (% female) 99.2 99.8 -.6 .22
Client age 18-24 3.6 2.6 1 .37
Client age 25-60 94.3 92.8 1.5 .35
Client age ≥ 60 2.1 4.7 -2.5 .03
Below PHP 2600 monthly income (%) 4.8 7.4 -2.6 .1
PHP 2601-4250 monthly income (%) 13.1 16.5 -3.5 .14
PHP 4251-5400 monthly income (%) 13.5 16.5 -3 .2
PHP 5401-6750 monthly income (%) 12.4 13.7 -1.3 .56
PHP 6751-8300 monthly income (%) 15.2 14.2 1 .68
PHP 8301-10300 monthly income (%) 18.1 14 4.2 .09
Above PHP 10300 monthly income (%) 22.9 17.7 5.3 .05
Household size 4.8 4.9 -.1 .27
Unforeseen household expenses (%) 24.6 15.1 9.5 0
Unforeseen business expenses (%) 15.2 12.6 2.6 .26
Amount owed to others (PHP) 546 572 -26 .9
Year of first loan with MFI 2005.8 2003.7 2 0
Last MFI loan amount (PHP) 8510 10583 -2073 0
The p-value stems from a means comparing t-test.
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Table 4.9: Summary statistics of client/household characteristics at baseline –
Cambodia 1
Variable Names Treatment Control Difference p-value
Sex of client (% female) 84 91.8 -7.8 0
Client age 41.32 41.5 -.18 .78
Years as client 1.61 2.11 -.51 0
Monthly household income (KHR) 768092 1263599 -495507 0
Household size 5.18 5.49 -.31 .01
Log of value of land in USD 6.34 6.41 -.07 .64
Household member sick/injured (%) 51.7 47 4.7 .11
Death, funeral or birth (%) 8.7 10 -1.3 .43
Crop damage due to natural disaster (%) 15.3 31.2 -15.8 0
Other damage due to natural disaster (%) 2.7 13 -10.3 0
Total amount owed (KHR) 92154900 67136825 25018075 0
The p-value stems from a means comparing t-test.
Table 4.10: Summary statistics of client/household characteristics at baseline –
Cambodia 2
Variable Names Treatment Control Difference p-value
Sex of client (% female) 92.2 92.3 0 .98
Client age 18-24 1.6 2.8 -1.2 .18
Client age 25-60 93.3 93.4 -.1 .95
Client age ≥ 60 5.1 3.8 1.3 .29
Below KHR 230,000 monthly income 12.8 35.8 -22.9 0
KHR 230,000-460,000 monthly income 27.5 29.3 -1.9 .49
KHR 460,000-1,250,000 monthly income 42 28.5 13.5 0
Above KHR 1,250,000 monthly income 17.7 6.4 11.3 0
Household size 5.3 4.9 .3 0
Unforeseen household expenses (%) 75.9 74 2 .44
Unforeseen business expenses (%) 24.1 21.6 2.4 .32
Amount owed to others (KHR) 328635 72109 256526 .07
Year of first loan with MFI 2007.4 2008.2 -.8 0
Last MFI loan amount (KHR) 694864 670830 24034 .41
Year of start of main activity 1992.5 1994.1 -1.6 .02
The p-value stems from a means comparing t-test.
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CHAPTER V
Parental Migration and the Education of Children
Left Behind
5.1 Introduction
Migration can have important consequences for both receiving and sending coun-
tries. A growing empirical literature investigates the impact of migration on human
capital accumulation in sending countries of which a relatively new feature is parental
migration.
Parental migration contributes to children’s education by making more resources
available (Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Yang, 2008). Through remittances, migra-
tion has the potential to alleviate credit constraints and thereby positively affect
enrollment in education. Another channel through which migration may increase
educational attainment is based on the idea that education has a high return when
migrating. Thus, the prospect of migration raises the expected returns of educa-
tion, inducing individuals to invest in education.1 However, as parental migration
implies family separation, it involves social and psychological costs (Ginther and Pol-
lak, 2004). Migration can have a negative effect on educational outcomes through
1Batista et al. (2012) find that the prospect of own future migration has a positive impact on
educational attainment. On the other hand, this is not necessarily the case as Chiquiar and Hanson
(2005) find the returns to education to be higher in Mexico than in the United States which gives
rise to a negative incentive effect to invest in education.
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parental absence, in particular due to lack of parental supervision and interaction,
lack of a role model, as well as family break-up. Communities with large remittances
inflows may experience social tensions, particularly if those that are perceived to
benefit most from migration are households that appear to have always been better
off. Additionally, parental migration may lead to a reallocation of labor within the
household as to replace the migrants’ labor or income. In particular, it may lead to
changes in duties and responsibilities within the household, leading to more pressure
on older children to help in the household or agriculture. Hence, children of migrants
may neglect school-related activities.
Empirical studies provide mixed evidence on whether migration has a net positive
or negative impact on educational outcomes. Many of the existing studies focus on
the role of migration in alleviating household budget constraints through remittances.
For example, Edwards and Ureta (2003), using data from El Salvador, find that re-
mittances reduce school dropout by providing additional sources of income. Yang
(2008) also provides evidence for a favourable effect of remittances on schooling in
the Philippines. A body of literature takes the potentially negative consequences of
parental absence into account. Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010), in a study based
on Albania, show that past parental migration has a negative effect on school atten-
dance and increases the likelihood of school dropout for children left behind. Hanson
and Woodruff (2003) find that having an international migrant raises educational
attainment for 10-15 years old girls, but only in households in which the mother
has less than 3 years of education. On the other hand, McKenzie and Rapoport
(2011) provide evidence that living in a migrant household lowers the probability for
boys completing junior high school and for boys and girls completing high school.
In addition, the authors find that the effect of migration is less negative in poorer
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households, as proxied by maternal education. Also, de Brauw and Giles (2006)
show that rural-urban migration opportunities reduce the probability of high school
enrollment in rural China. Antman (2011) explores the short-run effects of paternal
migration from Mexico to the United States, providing evidence that in the short-run
children reduce study hours and increase work hours in response to a father’s migra-
tion. In the long-run, however, paternal migration appears to increase educational
attainment for girls, but not for boys, suggesting that any adverse short-run effects
for boys are not reversed in the long-run (Antman, 2012). Nguyen and Purnamasari
(2011), who explore the gender dimension of parental migration in Indonesia, find
that female migration reduces child labor. However, they do not find an effect on
school enrollment or attendance.
In Moldova, parental migration is of considerable magnitude. According to
UNICEF (2009), around one fifth of children have at least one parent who has mi-
grated abroad. Children left behind by both parents mostly live with their grandpar-
ents, but also with their siblings and other relatives. Lu¨cke et al. (2009) report that,
when asked about the main effect of migration, households most frequently respond
with increased income through remittances as well as emotional stress for partners
and lack of parental care. Also in Moldova, Go¨rlich et al. (2007) find that living in
a migrant household substantially increases the probability of university enrollment.
Hence, part of the increase in university enrollment in recent years in Moldova may
be attributed to international migration. Parental migration may lead to behavioral
changes among children left behind in various ways. Based on a qualitative study
in Moldova, Vladicescu et al. (2008) find that children affected by parental migra-
tion more often engage in “rule-breaking activities”, e.g. criminal delinquency or
alcohol/drug abuse.
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This paper is interested in identifying the effect of parental migration on school-
ing outcomes. However, identification is complicated as migration is correlated with
family and individual characteristics, many of which are unobserved. Recent studies
rely on instrumental variables for identification. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) instru-
ment for whether a household has an international migrant with historical migration
rates at the state level interacted with household characteristics. McKenzie and
Rapoport (2011) also use historical migration rates at the state level. To instrument
for migration behavior, de Brauw and Giles (2006) exploit the timing of ID card
distribution in rural China. Go¨rlich et al. (2007) use as an instrument the differen-
tial degree to which the 35 Moldovan districts were exposed to demand for migrant
labor from abroad. Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008) use the geographic location of all
current and past migration spells in the United States of household members in each
household, assigning the US state-level unemployment rate and real weekly earnings
of Hispanic workers. For households without migration experience in the United
States, the authors use the unemployment rate as well as the real weekly informal
sector earnings in the Dominican Republic, an alternative destination for migrants
from Haiti. Generally, the exclusion restriction remains an issue for identification of
migration effects. For example, historical migration rates might be an indicator of the
current level of community development. Thus, through the quality of schools within
a community, the instrument may actually affect educational outcomes directly.
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the role of migration
across the migrant parent’s gender. Whereas other studies have looked at the impact
of migration on children’s education in the home country, the gender dimension of
parental migration has been much less explored in the literature. In particular, the
paper investigates whether maternal migration, which is associated with migration
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to Western and Southern Europe as well as Turkey, has an impact on the likelihood
of participation in school of children left behind. On the other hand, migration to
Russia and Ukraine is dominated by seasonal migration of male migrants. If children
are more sensitive to a father’s seasonal migration, then these children may be more
at risk of leaving school, despite any favourable effect of remittances.
My main empirical strategy consists of an instrumental variable approach where
I take advantage of the fact that some migration destinations are preferred by male
migrants, while others are preferred by female migrants. In addition, I use a fixed-
effects model to explore the impact of parental migration on household expenditures
for education. As a robustness check, I use a difference-in-differences approach.
I begin with a brief description of emigration in Moldova. Section 5.3 describes
the data. Section 5.4 presents the empirical specification and the results. Section
5.5 concludes.
5.2 Emigration in Moldova
The focus of this paper is on Moldova. In the Republic of Moldova, labor migra-
tion and workers’ remittances started off during the Russian financial crisis in 1998.
More than 80% of migrants departed for the first time since then (Cuc et al., 2005).
As of mid-2006, approximately one quarter of the economically active population was
employed abroad (Lu¨cke et al., 2007). According to regularly conducted labor force
surveys in Moldova, the number of migrants grew from less than 100,000 in 1999 to
more than 400,000 at the end of 2005, compared to an economically active popula-
tion of 1,474,000 people in 2003. The Department of Migration of the Government
of Moldova estimated the number of migrants at around 600,000 as of August 2004
(Ruggiero, 2005). Total remittances reported in the balance of payments increased
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from around US$ 100 million annually in the late 1990s to just under US$ 1 billion
in 2005, which is equivalent to about one third of GDP. In 2007, total remittances
stood at US$ 1.5 billion and at US$ 1.9 billion in 2008 (Lu¨cke et al., 2009).
Moldovan labor migrants choose two broad regions as destinations: the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), and Western and Southern Europe as well as
Turkey. Most migrants are occupied in Russia, followed by Italy. Other important
destinations include Ukraine, Portugal, France, Spain and Turkey. Male and female
migrants choose different destinations depending on job characteristics. Destinations
preferred by male migrants are CIS member countries, mainly Russia and Ukraine,
where migrant worker jobs are predominantly in the construction sector. Destina-
tions with migrant worker jobs predominantly in the service sector, such as Italy and
Turkey, are preferred by female migrants (Ruggiero, 2005).
Job characteristics and travel costs also affect the seasonality of migration. Mi-
gration to Western Europe tends to be on a permanent basis, while Ukraine and
Russia attract mostly seasonal migrants as there is not much construction in the
winter. Travel costs to Western Europe are considerable, amounting to as much as
US$ 3,600 one way in 2006. Crossing borders illegally makes traveling to Western
Europe so costly. In contrast, the average cost of (visa free) travel to CIS member
countries was around US$ 100 (Lu¨cke et al., 2007).
5.3 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on the IOM-CBSAXA survey, a
household panel survey conducted in 2006 and 2008. The survey was commissioned
by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Moldova Office and executed
by CBSAXA, an opinion research firm. The total number of households interviewed
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was close to 4,000. The survey is designed to be representative of Moldovan house-
holds at the national level (excluding Transnistria); one goal of the survey is to
compare households with migrants to those without. The second wave re-interview
rate was 89 percent in rural areas and 69 percent in urban areas (Lu¨cke et al., 2009).
The survey involves interviewing one household member, usually the head of
household, to give information on all household members, including those staying
abroad. Information has been collected on households’ socio-economic character-
istics and, since the survey centers on migration and remittances, on the year of
migration and the destination country, working and living conditions abroad, legal
status abroad, reasons for migration, and frequency and method of sending monetary
and in-kind remittances.
In this paper, the analysis is focused on children aged 11-18 years. I restrict the
sample for analysis in a number of ways. First, I restrict the sample to households
that report having both a household head and a spouse (not necessarily present at
the time of the survey as they might have been abroad). These households may be
headed by a male or female household member. Second, I restrict the sample to
households with children reported to be the household head’s own children. Using
own as opposed to any children present in the household helps to avoid observing chil-
dren for whom individuals other than the parents make schooling decisions (Hanson
and Woodruff, 2003).
For the purpose of this paper, information on household members’ educational
status is of particular importance. However, the corresponding question on what kind
of education was pursued at the time of the survey was only asked in the second wave
of the survey. Hence, I cannot fully exploit the panel structure of the sample with
respect to this variable.
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Table 5.1 shows summary statistics on whether a child was enrolled in school.
Among households without parental migration experience, enrollment is universal
for children aged 7 to 10 years, while being almost universal among parental migrant
households. Therefore, this paper excludes this age group from the analysis. Among
children aged 11 to 15 years, school enrollment is smaller in non-migrant households
(92.5%) than in migrant households (96.4%). School enrollment drops to 84.6% and
81.8% in non-migrant and migrant households, respectively among children who are
between 16 and 18 years old. Across gender, differences in school enrollment are
statistically significant among 16-18 years old children only, both in non-migrant
and migrant households (see Table 5.10 in the Appendix).
Table 5.2 shows summary statistics on migration. In 2006, the share of households
with migration experience is 34% (in 2008: 37%).2 When I apply above-mentioned
sample restrictions, the sample size decreases from 3853 to 1878 households (in 2006).
Effectively, the restricted sample is comprised of households with children who live
with both parents and who are the household head’s own children. In non-parental
migrant households, neither the head nor the spouse have migration experience,
while in parental migrant households the head or the spouse are reported to have
been abroad currently or in the past. The share of households with parental mi-
gration experience is 38% (in 2008: 41%). The father is more often the migrant
than the mother, more precisely the spouse;3 in 22.5% of cases (not shown) both the
father and the mother have migration experience (in 2008: 24.1%). Total time spent
2The sample size in 2008 is only marginally smaller than in 2006. The reason is that in case a
household interviewed in 2006 could not be re-interviewed, a new household was drawn as replace-
ment.
3Households report the relationship between any household member and the head of household
only. Thus, I do not know whether the household head’s own children are also the spouse’s children.
Nevertheless, the assumption that the spouse is the mother (if the spouse is female) appears to be
reasonable.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics (means) on school enrollment in 2008, by parental
migration status
Non-migrant Parent-migrant
households households Difference
Boys and girls
7-10 years old 1 0.994 0.00610
(0.00638)
11-15 years old 0.925 0.964 -0.0387∗∗
(0.0183)
16-18 years old 0.846 0.818 0.0274
(0.0335)
Boys
7-10 years old 1 0.989 0.0115
(0.0116)
11-15 years old 0.913 0.951 -0.0374
(0.0296)
16-18 years old 0.796 0.765 0.0309
(0.0541)
Girls
7-10 years old 1 1 0
(0)
11-15 years old 0.938 0.974 -0.0351
(0.0225)
16-18 years old 0.892 0.864 0.0275
(0.0403)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics on migration
2006 2008
Obs Mean Obs Mean
Migrant household 3853 .34 3812 .37
Parental migration 1878 .38 1775 .41
Migrant mother 1878 .16 1775 .18
Migrant father 1878 .31 1775 .34
Migration duration (in months) 709 19.23 733 19.77
Years since last migration 0 . 462 1.46
Destination Turkey 688 .036 726 .032
Destination Russia 688 .669 726 .697
Destination Italy 688 .157 726 .165
Destination Cyprus 718 .007 734 .003
Destination Spain 718 .018 734 .014
Destination France 718 .017 734 .014
Destination Romania 688 .02 726 .026
Destination Greece 688 .016 726 .012
Destination Ukraine 688 .041 726 .05
abroad averages 19.2 and 19.8 months in 2006 and 2008, respectively. Time elapsed
since the last migration spell, reported in the second wave of the survey only, is on
average 1.5 years. Among parental migrant households, the majority have migration
experience in Russia, followed by Italy. This pattern is highly stable between 2006
and 2008. Distinguishing parental migration by whether the mother or the father
went abroad, Table 5.3 shows that, while still the majority of both migrant mothers
and migrant fathers went to Russia, there is a marked difference in the distribution of
destination countries across gender. A much larger share of migrant mothers went to
Italy or Turkey, while an overwhelming majority of migrant fathers went to Russia.
As mentioned above, Italy and Turkey demand migrant labor in the service sector
(household help, elder care etc.), which is predominantly met by women migrant
workers.
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics (shares) on migration by maternal/paternal migration
2006 2008
Mother Father Mother Father
Destination Turkey .081 .036 .073 .022
Destination Russia .509 .748 .553 .779
Destination Italy .302 .093 .291 .1
Destination Cyprus .01 .009 .006 .003
Destination Spain .023 .016 .022 .012
Destination France .02 .014 .022 .01
Destination Romania .025 .016 .038 .024
Destination Greece .025 .013 .022 .01
Destination Ukraine .039 .048 .054 .059
Table 5.4 reports household characteristics by parental migration status. Not
surprisingly, in almost all households the sex of the head of household is male.
Parental migrant households are relatively young, compared to non-parental migrant
households, in terms of the household head’s age as well as the age of the spouse.
Household heads as well as spouses in migrant households have less often primary
education and more often secondary education compared to their counterparts in
non-migrant households who have more often higher education. Migrant households
have a larger household size. One may expect that migrant households have a larger
number of household members, in particular grandparents or siblings, as they may
take care of children left behind by their parents. While this is the case for children
below age 18 years and young adults, parent-migrant households have fewer members
aged 65 years or above. Migrant households live more often in rural areas and they
also more often possess land. Moreover, they live less often in the municipality of
Chisinau (the capital) and more often in the northern and southern districts (except
the autonomous region of Gagauzia), compared to non-migrant households.
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Table 5.4: Summary statistics (means) on household characteristics
in 2008, by parental migration status
Non-migrant Parent-migrant
households households Difference
Head is male 0.954 0.964 -0.0104
(0.0100)
Age of head 48.74 42.95 5.795∗∗∗
(0.519)
Head has no completed formal education 0.00430 0.00716 -0.00287
(0.00371)
Head has primary education 0.140 0.0903 0.0494∗∗∗
(0.0161)
Head has secondary education 0.534 0.670 -0.137∗∗∗
(0.0244)
Head has higher education 0.322 0.232 0.0901∗∗∗
(0.0225)
Age of spouse 45.88 39.79 6.090∗∗∗
(0.529)
Spouse has no completed formal education 0.00644 0.00860 -0.00215
(0.00428)
Spouse has primary school 0.140 0.0917 0.0479∗∗∗
(0.0162)
Spouse has secondary school 0.483 0.586 -0.103∗∗∗
(0.0249)
Spouse has higher education 0.371 0.314 0.0568∗∗
(0.0238)
Household size 3.936 4.239 -0.304∗∗∗
(0.0569)
No. of adults 18-25 years old 0.676 0.764 -0.0880∗∗
(0.0406)
No. of adults 26-64 years old 2.070 2.100 -0.0305
(0.0332)
No. of adults ≥ 65 years old 0.245 0.0788 0.166∗∗∗
(0.0243)
No. of children ≤ 6 years old 0.271 0.401 -0.130∗∗∗
(0.0293)
No. of children 7-17 years old 0.673 0.921 -0.248∗∗∗
(0.0427)
Rural 0.600 0.775 -0.175∗∗∗
(0.0231)
Household owns land 0.683 0.761 -0.0776∗∗∗
(0.0225)
Expenditure sum per adult equivalent 1392.6 1416.0 -23.39
(54.70)
Central district 0.269 0.301 -0.0323
(0.0225)
Municipality Chisinau 0.273 0.109 0.164∗∗∗
(0.0197)
Northern district 0.261 0.335 -0.0742∗∗∗
(0.0227)
Southern district (except Gagauzia) 0.168 0.212 -0.0445∗∗
(0.0195)
Gagauzia 0.0301 0.0430 -0.0129
(0.00928)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5.4 Empirical specification and results
This paper is interested in identifying the effect of parental migration on schooling
outcomes. However, migration is correlated with family and individual characteris-
tics, many of which are not observed by the econometrician. Selection into migration
is of concern to the study as it is likely to be based on unobserved individual or house-
hold characteristics. Generally, the direction of bias is unclear a priori. It may be
upward or downward depending on the type of selection into migration.
In a study on the gains from migration, McKenzie et al. (2006) compare sev-
eral non-experimental methods to the experimental estimate. The authors use data
from a natural experiment in which migrant applicants to New Zealand from Tonga
are selected by a lottery, concluding that among the non-experimental methods the
instrumental variable approach performed best, but only with a good instrument.
Difference-in-differences and propensity score matching performed better than the
ordinary least squares estimator.
My main empirical strategy consists of an instrumental variable approach where
I take advantage of the fact that some migration destinations are preferred by male
migrants, while others are preferred by female migrants. In addition, I use a fixed-
effects model to explore the impact of parental migration on household expenditures
for education.
5.4.1 Instrumental variables
I begin by estimating the impact of parental migration on education using ordi-
nary least squares. The reduced form regression is:
(5.1) Yi = α + βPMi + Xiδ + i,
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where I estimate the effect of individual i′s parental migration experience PMi on her
schooling outcome Yi. Xi is an individual and household-specific vector of controls,
and i is the error term. Since school participation is a binary variable, I estimate
the effect of parental migration using the linear probability model.
I control for household and individual characteristics to account for possible cor-
relation between parental migration experience and the error term. For example, I
do not observe local labor market shocks – a variable that is likely to be correlated
with migration as well as with education. However, I do observe household and indi-
vidual characteristics that inter alia determine how well a household is able to cope
with labor market shocks. Furthermore, controlling for a variable such as wealth is
mandated as wealthy households may be more likely to migrate and invest more in
education relative to poor households.
The vector Xi includes the following household and individual characteristics.
Variables controlling for household composition are comprised of the sex and the age
of the household head, and the number of children below the age of 7. Additional
household-level control variables include dummy variables indicating the level of
education of the head of household and the spouse, expenditures per adult equivalent,
whether the household owns land and whether the household lives in a rural area. I
also include regional variables or, alternatively, a full set of district controls. Variables
controlling for individual characteristics are the child’s age and sex.
Tables 5.5-5.7 in columns 1-6 present results based on ordinary least squares.
Columns 1-3 use regional controls, while columns 4-6 use a full set of district-level
controls. I do not find a statistically significant coefficient of parental migration
in Table 5.5. Differentiating by the gender of the parent migrant, I still do not
find a statistically significant coefficient, despite a negative coefficient on maternal
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migration for girls (Table 5.7). Neither do I find a statistically significant coefficient
of parental migration when disaggregating children’s age into age groups 11-15 and
16-18 years old (see columns 1-6 in Tables 5.11-5.16 in the Appendix).
In Table 5.8 in columns 1-6, I explore the impact of parental migration on house-
hold expenditures for education based on ordinary least squares. I find parental
migration to increase education expenditures. Parental migrant households spend
43.5 Moldovan lei (s.e.= 25.9) more on education per month, which is around US$
3.5.
To account for selection into migration, I use an instrumental variables strategy
that relies on the differential degree to which the 35 Moldovan districts were exposed
to migration in 2004. All else equal, households with better access to migration
networks should be more likely to send migrants abroad. This instrumental variables
strategy is likely to be valid only conditionally as, for example, migration rates in
2004 might be indicators of district-level development in 2008. Therefore, I use
regional controls to account for differences in community development that might be
driven by migration.4
Figure 5.1 shows migration rates in 2004 according to the 2004 population census
and the sample shares of migrant households in 2008. It is apparent that migration
rates in 2004 are strongly correlated with the share of migrant households in the year
2008 sample.
In addition, following Hanson and Woodruff (2003), I interact district-level migra-
tion rates with household characteristics. Access to migration networks is unlikely to
be the only factor influencing household migration decisions, differences in expected
4I cannot use district controls as these would be collinear with the instrument.
138
Chisinau
Orhei
Anenii Noi
Briceni
GlodeniCriuleni
Telenesti
Singerei
Hincesti
Straseni
Ialoveni
Floresti
Soroca
Leova
U.T.A. Gagauzia
Cimislia
Stefan Voda
Edinet
Calarasi
Causeni
Nisporeni
FalestiDrochia
Balti
Ungheni
Rezina
Dubasari Basarabeasca
Soldanesti
Risca i
Donduseni
Cantemir
Cahul
Taraclia
Ocnita
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
Sh
ar
e 
of
 m
ig
ra
nt
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
in
 2
00
8
.04 .06 .08 .1 .12
Migration rate in 2004
Figure 5.1: Migration rate (census-based) in 2004 and share of migrant households
in year 2008 sample
earnings profiles between the home country and potential destinations are also ex-
pected to play a role. In order to account for differences in expected earnings profiles,
I interact district-level migration rates with the spouse’s age. Additionally, this em-
pirical strategy allows me to include a full set of district controls as the instrument
now varies at the household level.
From Figure 5.2 it is apparent that spouses from parental migrant households tend
to be younger than spouses from non-migrant households with children. Households
with younger spouses, who may be migrants themselves, are over-represented among
emigrant households, arguably due to differences in earnings profiles.
I define the instrument depending on the gender of the parent migrant. While for
parental migration I use the general district-level migration rate, for a father’s migra-
tion I restrict the migration rate to cover male-dominated destination countries only,
in particular Russia and Ukraine. For a mother’s migration I restrict the migration
139
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
D
en
si
ty
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age
Non−migrant
Migrant
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rate to cover the region of Western and Southern Europe as well as Turkey, including
female-dominated destination countries such as Turkey, Cyprus, Italy, Greece, and
Spain.
Tables 5.5-5.7 in columns 7-12 present results based on the instrumental variable
approach. Columns 7-9 use the migration rate in 2004 and its interaction with the
spouse’s age as instruments along with regional controls, while columns 10-12 use
only the interacted migration rate as an instrument along with a full set of district-
level controls.
Compared to the coefficients stemming from the ordinary least squares estima-
tions, the coefficients are now much larger in size. However, it should be noted that
the binary variable indicating parental migration status has been replaced by the
probability of parental migration. As a consequence, a coefficient of 0.48 should be
interpreted as follows: an increase in the probability of parental migration by 10
percentage points raises school enrollment by 0.1 ∗ 0.48 = 0.048 percentage points.5
5See also Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008).
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In Table 5.5 I do not detect impact of parental migration on school enrollment.
Differentiating by the gender of the migrant, I still do not detect impact (see Tables
5.6 and 5.7), except for a negative effect of maternal migration (see column 9 in
Table 5.7); however, this effect is not robust to using a full set of district controls (see
column 12). Neither do I detect impact when disaggregating children into age groups
11-15 and 16-18 years old (see columns 7-12 in Tables 5.11-5.16 in the Appendix).
The findings on the other covariates are in line with expectations. The negative
coefficient on the child’s age suggests that children are less likely to be enrolled with
increasing age. Children with better educational household background are more
likely to be enrolled. Children from households with a larger number of younger
children are less likely to be enrolled. The positive coefficient on a child being female
suggests that girls do not suffer from a gender bias; to the contrary, they are more
likely to be enrolled compared to boys. Land ownership is found to reduce the
probability of school enrollment for boys, but not for girls, suggesting that boys
might be engaged in agriculture or other activities rather than being enrolled in
school.
In some instances, the F-statistic for testing the joint significance of excluded
instruments (reported at the bottom of the tables) is rather low, particularly when
instrumenting for paternal migration, indicating a potential problem of weak instru-
ments. Therefore, I redefine the outcome variable to include participation in school
at the household level. This variable now measures the share of children being en-
rolled in school within a household. Results are reported in Tables 5.17-5.19 in the
Appendix. As can be seen from the bottom of the tables, the F-statistic for testing
the joint significance of excluded instruments has improved considerably. However,
I still do not detect impact of parental migration on school enrollment.
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Exploring the impact of parental migration on household expenditures for ed-
ucation, in column 7 in Table 5.8 I find parental migration to reduce education
expenditures. However, the point estimate becomes statistically insignificant when
including district controls (see column 10), suggesting that education expenditures
might be driven by differences that are inherent to districts rather than by parental
migration. Differentiating by the gender of the migrant, I do not detect impact.
5.4.2 Fixed-effects
As mentioned earlier, the question on what kind of education was pursued at
the time of the survey was only asked in the second wave of the survey. However,
I do observe the same household over time with respect to education expenditures.
Hence, I can use the fixed-effects estimator to investigate the impact of migration on
household expenditures for education.
The model to be estimated is as follows:
(5.2) Yit = α + βPMit + Xitγ + ci + uit,
where PMit is a binary variable indicating household i’s parental migration experi-
ence,6 Xit is vector of time-varying household-specific characteristics, ci is an unob-
served household fixed effect and uit is the error term.
The time-varying household controls include the age of the household head, the
number of children below the age of 7, the number of children aged between 7 and 17
years, the number of young adults, and the number of elderly household members;
the number of adults aged between 26 and 64 years form the reference category.
In Table 5.9 I find positive impact of parental migration on household expendi-
tures for education. Children who are affected by parental migration live in house-
6Household i’s parental migration experience is time-varying as some households switch from
non-migrant to migrant status during the two waves of the survey.
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holds that have 133.9 Moldovan lei (s.e.= 37.2) larger education expenditures per
month, which is around US$ 11. Differentiating by the gender of the migrant, point
estimates remain statistically significant and are similar in size.
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Table 5.9: Fixed-effects estimator, expenditures for education
(1) (2) (3)
Parental migration 133.9∗∗∗
(37.2)
Paternal migration 137.1∗∗∗
(38.4)
Maternal migration 119.6∗
(47.1)
Age of head 0.5 0.5 0.7
(2.6) (2.6) (2.6)
No. of children ≤ 6 years old -87.7∗ -91.2∗ -84.0∗
(38.2) (38.2) (38.2)
No. of children 7-17 years old -40.2 -40.6 -41.7
(30.9) (30.9) (30.9)
No. of adults 18-25 years old 80.6∗∗ 82.0∗∗ 78.8∗∗
(26.8) (26.8) (26.9)
No. of adults ≥ 65 years old -96.2 -99.2 -98.6
(56.4) (56.4) (56.5)
Observations 3265 3265 3265
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Household expenditures for education.
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5.4.3 Robustness check
As the data stem from a panel survey, an obvious strategy to resolve issues related
to unobserved variables would be to exploit the time dimension of the data. As a
robustness check, I use a difference-in-differences methodology. The key identification
assumption is that there are no time-varying unobserved variables influencing the
outcome and that are correlated with migration behavior. As the question on the
kind of education each household member pursued was only asked in the second
wave of the survey, I use instead a measure of school participation that is based on
the labor force status which households reported in 2006 and 2008. As the survey
restricted labor force related questions to individuals above the age of 16, I use
school participation for children aged 17-18 years. It should be noted that I cannot
perform a fixed-effects estimation as children who belong to the age group 17-18
years old in 2006 will have outgrown their age group two years later in 2008, making
it impossible to observe the same individual twice in the data. Nevertheless, I can
use a difference-in-differences approach, using the 17-18 years age group in 2006 and
2008 for estimation.
Table 5.20 in the Appendix presents summary statistics on the labor force based
outcome variable. Compared to Table 5.1, school participation is generally lower,
which is not surprising as children are older under the labor force based measure.
Across gender, the difference in school participation becomes statistically significant
in 2006, school participation being larger for girls than for boys, only when I pool
non-migrant and parental migrant households (see Table 5.21 in the Appendix).
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I use the following regression formulation of the difference-in-differences approach,
specifying a linear model:
(5.3) Yit = α + γPMit + λt2008 + Xitδ + β(PMit ∗ t2008) + uit,
where PMit is a binary variable indicating parental migration experience, t2008 is a
time dummy, Xit is an individual and household-specific vector of controls, and uit
is the error term. The coefficient β on the interaction between PMit and t2008 gives
the average treatment effect. The vector Xit includes the same set of household and
individual characteristics as in Section 5.4.1.
Tables 5.22-5.24 in the Appendix present results on the impact of parental mi-
gration using three specifications. Specification (1) does not include any controls,
giving the simple double difference in sample means, that is the difference in changes
in outcomes over time and across treatment and control group. Specification (2)
uses individual, household, and regional controls. Specification (3) uses a full set of
district controls instead of regional controls.
In Table 5.22, while the coefficient on the interaction term is positive when in-
cluding covariates, it is never statistically significant. Differentiating by the gender
of the parent migrant in Tables 5.23 and 5.24, I still do not detect impact. In Table
5.24, reporting results on maternal migration, the coefficient on the interaction term
is mostly negative, though it is never statistically significant.
Apart from participation in school, I also explore the impact of parental migra-
tion on monthly household education expenditures using the difference-in-differences
estimator (see Table 5.25 for results). While the coefficient on the interaction term
is positive, except for maternal migration, it is never statistically significant.
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As an additional robustness check, I reran the full analysis restricting the sample
to rural households. Alternatively, I restrict the sample to households that have adult
equivalent household expenditures below the median. I still do not detect impact on
school enrollment (not shown).
Furthermore, I drop households which have both paternal and maternal migration
experience. As mentioned in Section 5.3, in 24.1% of cases both the father and
the mother have migration experience in 2008. When re-running the full analysis,
changes in results are only minor (not shown).
Finally, I restrict the sample to households where the head of household has
both sons and daughters.7 This is important because if the impact of parental
migration differed across households – only boy children households, only girl children
households, and mix-sex children households –, then my results would be confounded
by this. Re-running the full analysis using the restricted sample, changes in results
are only minor (not shown).
5.5 Conclusion
Parental migration may contribute to children’s education by making more re-
sources available. However, as parental migration implies family separation, it in-
volves social and psychological costs. Additionally, it may lead to changes in duties
and responsibilities within the household as well as changes in the incentives to obtain
education.
This paper evaluated the impact of migration on school enrollment of children
who are left behind by their parents, allowing the effect to vary with the gender of the
migrant. Whereas other studies have explored the impact of migration on children’s
7The sample used in the main analysis is comprised of households with at least one child,
irrespective of the sex, being the household head’s own child.
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education in the sending country, the migrant gender dimension of parental migration
has received less attention in the literature.
I found parental migration to increase household education expenditures, pro-
viding evidence that migration makes more resources available that are spent on
children’s education. On the other hand, I did not detect impact on school partic-
ipation. Results are consistent with migration having both positive and negative
effects that cancel each other out.
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Appendix
Table 5.10: Summary statistics (means) on school enrollment in 2008, by children’s
sex
Boys Girls Difference
All
7-10 years old 0.994 1 -0.00581
(0.00640)
11-15 years old 0.932 0.959 -0.0277
(0.0183)
16-18 years old 0.782 0.880 -0.0973∗∗∗
(0.0330)
Non-migrant
7-10 years old 1 1 0
(0)
11-15 years old 0.913 0.938 -0.0251
(0.0316)
16-18 years old 0.796 0.892 -0.0963∗∗
(0.0426)
Parental migrant
7-10 years old 0.989 1 -0.0115
(0.0122)
11-15 years old 0.951 0.974 -0.0228
(0.0208)
16-18 years old 0.765 0.864 -0.0997∗
(0.0519)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5.20: Summary statistics (means) on participation in education based on labor
force status, by parental migration status
Non-migrant Parental migrant Difference
17-18 years old
2006 0.719 0.765 -0.0463
(0.0447)
2008 0.751 0.758 -0.00664
(0.0466)
17-18 years old, boys
2006 0.673 0.730 -0.0569
(0.0673)
2008 0.724 0.729 -0.00443
(0.0721)
17-18 years old, girls
2006 0.759 0.800 -0.0411
(0.0591)
2008 0.775 0.782 -0.00710
(0.0610)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5.21: Summary statistics (means) on participation in education based on labor
force status, by children’s sex
Boys Girls Difference
17-18 years old
2006 0.701 0.777 -0.0767∗
(0.0444)
2008 0.726 0.778 -0.0517
(0.0465)
17-18 years old, non-migrant
2006 0.673 0.759 -0.0855
(0.0622)
2008 0.724 0.775 -0.0504
(0.0633)
17-18 years old, parental migrant
2006 0.730 0.800 -0.0697
(0.0635)
2006 0.729 0.782 -0.0530
(0.0691)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
This dissertation presented four essays on development economics. The first two
essays investigated educational challenges in rural Ethiopia. The first essay evaluated
the impact of a school meals program on educational outcomes. We did not detect
impact on learning achievement, concentration or cognitive development. Findings
nevertheless showed that the modalities and the implementation of the program play
an important role. We found that supplementing on-site school meals with take-home
rations is beneficial. Children were found to benefit from household contributions to
the program. The timing of serving meals was also found to play a role. Chapter III
explored the role of poor eyesight on educational outcomes in rural Ethiopia. Re-
sults showed that poor vision substantially increases school dropout for girls. Girls
that suffer from poor eyesight have a 6.1 or 8 percentage points higher probability
of school dropout. Conditional on being enrolled in school, the study also provided
evidence that, for boys and girls, learning achievement is adversely affected by poor
eyesight. Chapter IV explored the role of adding non-financial services, in particular
financial literacy training, to a microfinance institution’s product portfolio. We in-
vestigated the role of four financial training programs implemented in Vietnam, the
Philippines and Cambodia on financial attitude, risk management, over-indebtedness
170
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and vulnerability. Our findings showed that financial literacy training can play an
important role in terms of improving attitudes towards financial issues as well as im-
proving risk management strategies. We found financial education to improve loan
repayment performance despite evidence for increased borrowing. However, on the
ultimate goal of reducing vulnerability we did not detect impact. In Chapter V,
the final essay examined the impact of parental migration on school participation of
children who are left behind in Moldova. The study did not detect impact on school
participation. Results nevertheless showed that parental migration increases educa-
tion expenditures, providing evidence that migration makes more resources available
that are spent on children’s education.
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